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METROPOLITANIZATION AND LAND-USE 
PAROCHIALISM-TOWARD A 
JUDICIAL ATTITUDE 
Michael H. Feiler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN 1926 the United States Supreme Court dangled before the courts of this country a "carrot on a string" that the courts have been 
attempting to snare ever since. The occasion was the celebrated case 
of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,1 in which the 
Court held that the division of Euclid, Ohio, into a number of use 
districts was a valid exercise of the police power. More significantly 
for present purposes, the Court also decided that a municipality 
located in the path of regional industrial development may none-
theless determine its own destiny by providing for the health, safety, 
and welfare of its own citizens. The "carrot" was the caveat that 
[i]t is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases 
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest 
of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to 
stand in the way.2 
Since the Euclid decision, however, courts seem to be no closer 
to apprehending exactly which situations require subservience of 
municipal interests to larger public interests. This failure on the 
part of the courts is especially important in that since Euclid dealt 
with a constitutional limitation on the police power, the caveat and 
the questions it poses are significant in formulating judicial controls 
of local zoning actions. In fact, when viewed as a constitutional 
limitation on local zoning powers, the question of "greater interest" 
becomes a nagging spirit that may justifiably lead one to the conclu-
sion that there is something inherently wrong with present judicial 
attitudes toward local zoning. 
The purpose of this Article is to explore those situations in which 
courts have given meaning to the Euclid caveat in operation, and, 
from those instances, to attempt to evolve a judicial approach to the 
problems posed by the conflict between purely local interests on 
the one hand and more comprehensive regional interests on the 
other. Four basic premises are herein indulged: (1) that strictly 
• Adjunct Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.S. 1961, Antioch College; 
J.D. 1968, Detroit College of Law; LL.M. 1969, Harvard Law School.-Ed. 
1. 272 U.S. 865 (1926). 
2. 272 U.S. at 890. 
[655] 
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local zoning is unsatisfactory; (2) that new and innovative legislation 
will not be readily forthcoming; (3) that the burden of mediating 
these conflict situations will continue to fall upon the judiciary; and 
(4) that present judicial expressions threaten more harm than good 
by treating this crucial matter in an ad hoc fashion without pro-
ducing any meaningful metropolitan or regional land-use theories. 
With the development of a rational judicial approach to metro-
politan zoning problems, it is hoped that local governing bodies may 
become more planning conscious and that the courts, in an essen-
tially uncomfortable judicial role, may mediate land-use disputes 
with greater aplomb, predictability, and substantive justice. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
A. The Problem of Self-Serving Zoning 
The problem of land-use distributions is essentially a social prob-
lem-it affects where and how people live, how much wealth they 
control, which kinds of employment opportunities are available to 
them, and a myriad of social and economic interrelationships. Land-
use decisions concern both social and economic values, and these 
concerns often compete with each other. This competition, however, 
is not a free one. Social values tend to find their expression in isola-
tion while economic interests are well represented by the real-estate 
industry, lending institutions, and neighborhood groups concerned 
with property values. Jacob Ukeles has stated: 
It is the values, wishes and beliefs of these powerful groups that 
have the most influence on the allocations, organization and use of 
urban space. Great fiscal resources and decision-making power sub-
ject, of course, to internal competition, enable them to satisfy their 
own needs and values. But while these groups carry out social roles, 
and do respond to social values, they are primarily economic and 
political institutions acting in response to essentially economic needs 
in a power situation.3 
Modern urban conditions and problems have highlighted the 
social aspects of land controls. The dangers in allowing each com-
munity to attempt to solve its own problems without regard to the 
general wants and needs of the region in which the community is 
situated have become apparent. In this regard, the President's Na-
tional Commission on Urban Problems found that 
[t]oday, a basic problem results because of the delegation of the 
zoning power from the states to local governments of any size. This 
3. J. UKELFS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 14 (1964). 
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often results in a type of Balkanization, which is intolerable in large 
urban areas where local government boundaries rarely reflect the true 
economic and social watersheds. The present indiscriminate distribu-
tion of zoning authority leads to incompatible uses along municipal 
borders, duplication of public facilities, attempted exclusion of re-
gional facilities. 
One of the country's foremost legal experts on zoning notes that 
zoning is caught between two objectives: protection of the family 
home, which requires positive government action, and protection of 
the free market, which requires government refusal to take action. 
He questions the narrow court view of zoning as fitting into real es-
tate law when, through subtle forms of discrimination, for instance, 
zoning affects people and the nature of society, not just land. In 
short, although the basic justification for zoning is to protect the 
over-all public good, this often appears to be the last consideration as 
zoning is now practiced.4 
The Commission's conclusions succinctly frame the issue pre-
sented for analysis--whether because of judicial action or inaction 
zoning does not often operate contrary to the public welfare rather 
than in furtherance of it. While it is accepted doctrine that all prop-
erty is held subject to the needs of the common weal, the concept 
of promoting the public health, safety, welfare, or morals has offered 
little guidance to harried judges who are called upon to decide where 
the public interest lies. Courts have generally responded (perhaps 
understandably) to this task by deferring to the judgment of local 
legislators when a challenged ordinance presents at least a debatable 
question of reasonableness5 and have thus refused to become em-
broiled in the substantive decision-making processes. Indeed, each 
zoning ordinance is said to come to the courts clothed with a pre-
sumption of validity that the challenger has the burden of overcom-
ing. 6 
In terms of urban land distribution problems, the police power 
4. NATL. COMlllN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, REPORT: BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 19 
(1969). 
5. See, e.g., Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 431, 86 
N.W.2d 166, 169 (1957): "It is not our function to approve the ordinance before us as 
to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the 
ballot box, not the courts." 
See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
6. See, e.g., State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 52 P.2d 890 (1935); Bellings v. Township 
of Denville, 96 N.J. Super. 351, 356, 233 A.2d 73, 76 (Super. Ct. 1967) (requires an 
"affirmative showing that it [the ordinance) is arbitrary or unreasonable''). In Vickers 
v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 242, 181 A.2d 129, 134 (1962), the New Jersey supreme 
court stated: "[T]he plaintiff to prevail must show beyond debate that the Township 
in adopting the challenged amendment transgressed the standards of [the New Jersey 
Zoning Enabling act]." 
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approach has proven ineffective in inspiring metropolitan planning 
or cooperation-either voluntary or mandatory. Rather, it has left 
each municipality free to decide for itself what shall be its character 
and its relation to neighboring communities. The result has been 
the tendency to view land control as an essentially negative mech-
anism that seeks to prohibit certain specified uses rather than to aid 
or encourage certain more beneficial ones. In comparison to the 
views prevailing in Europe, the American view has been character-
ized as a "maximum amount of private volition kept within bounds 
by a largely negative public law."7 The restraints on this body of 
negative law rest with the judiciary through the operation of the 
somewhat amorphous terms, "public health, safety, and welfare." 
Such vague notions do provide a mechanism for reconciling com-
peting interests on an ad hoc basis, but unfortunately offer little 
guidance in directing how conflicts should be resolved. 
To begin to formulate a solution to the problems of urban zoning 
controls, it is first necessary to identify the kinds of problems that are 
involved. As has been pointed out by Justice Hall of the New Jersey 
supreme court: 
Regional or, for that matter, local institutions generally recognized 
as serving the public welfare are too important to be prevented from 
locating on available, appropriate sites, subject to reasonable qualifi-
cations and safeguards, by the imposition of exclusionary or un-
necessarily onerous municipal legislation enacted for the sake of 
preserving the established or proposed character of a community or 
some portion of it ... or. to further some other equally indefensible 
parochial interest. And, of course, if one municipality can so act, all 
can, with the result that needed and desirable institutions end up 
with no suitable place to locate. In my view, such action is not legit-
imately encompassed by the zoning power and the courts have the 
power to and should say so. The substantive question seems to me to 
fall clearly within the ... language from Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co .•.. 8 
As Justice Hall intimates, the Euclid opinion does presage a 
judicial role in assessing which uses of land are sufficiently related 
to the public well-being to be permissible and in determining when 
their local exclusion is not in furtherance of the public welfare. It 
is clear, moreover, that if the judiciary is to have a role in this area, 
there must be a theory or doctrine upon which it can act; simply 
7. Cribbet, Some Reflections on the Law of the Land-A View from Scandinavia, 
62 Nw. U. L. REY. 277 (1967). 
8. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 223, 220 A.2d 
97, 103 (1966) ijustice Hall, concurring) (emphasis added). 
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employing an ad hoc analysis of which uses seem important under 
the circumstances will not suffice. The question how courts should 
proceed is a vital one. 
There can be little doubt that the social and economic implica-
tions of local zoning extend beyond municipal boundaries, especially 
in a metropolitan community. The acute dilemma posed by local 
autonomy is hinted at by the findings of the President's National 
Commission on Urban Problems9 and is dramatically portrayed by 
Professor Roger Cunningham: 
In 1960 some 125 million Americans-73 per cent of the total pop-
ulation-lived in "urban" areas, and 113 million of them-63 per 
cent of the total population-lived in 212 Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas. These 212 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
contained 255 "central cities," 310 counties, and the staggering total 
of 4,142 municipalities .... It is obvious that under such conditions 
zoning on a municipal basis cannot achieve anything more than a 
haphazard and uncoordinated pattern of urban land uses within the 
metropolitan areas.10 
Whether one perceives such urban problems as being the result 
of uneconomic land-use patterns or inefficient government, it is clear 
that the effects have far-reaching implications. The effects are ex-
perienced not only in adjoining communities and the metropolitan 
area, but throughout the state and nation as well. Zoning has a defi-
nite influence upon the nature of urban society, as well as upon 
how people live, and the educational, medical, housing, recreational, 
and service facilities available to them. The effect of zoning on the 
condition of our urban life is generally negative-while zoning 
does not directly dictate the location of hospitals, schools, or the like, 
zoning restrictions do have a profound indirect effect upon their 
location. Because such uses-as well as industrial, commercial, and 
residential uses-are indirectly affected by zoning, the people whose 
lives depend on the existence and location of such facilities are also 
profoundly affected by it.11 
There are three categories in which the effects of parochial land-
use controls are most acutely felt: (1) problems that all municipalities 
share, such as air pollution, adequate clean water supply, and the 
9. See text accompanying note 4 supra. 
IO. Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 
367, 405-06 (1965). 
11. See generally s. WILLHELM, URBAN ZONING AND LAND USE THEORY (1962) (the 
basic ecological phenomena that locate people within an urban matrix are Materialistic 
(symbiotic dependence on other uses) and Voluntaristic (cultural motivation attracting 
the need uses to the location)); J. UKELES, supra note 3, at 44. 
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like; (2) problems created by the need for facilities that cannot be 
supplied within the community, such as recreational facilities, gar-
bage disposal facilities, utilities, educational facilities, and the like; 
and (3) problems for which the principal community satisfies its own 
needs but for which other communities must look to the facilities 
of the principal community, such as quiet residential neighborhoods, 
undeveloped land suitable for institutional or industrial develop-
ment, and less expensive land on which to construct low-profit 
operations such as low-income housing.12 It seems natural enough 
that regional problems are caused primarily by the protective de-
vices employed by municipalities finding themselves in the third 
category. It follows too that the judicial role in regionalism, if there 
is to be one, must likewise be concerned with the problem evidenced 
in this category. Many land-use activities in this category do not 
find expression in the market place-the myriad of activities which, 
from a private standpoint, may be inefficient and uneconomical, 
but which nevertheless have a substantial social impact that may 
cause the economic interest to yield.13 In attempting to exclude such 
particularized uses as hospitals or schools, it may be possible for a 
community to show a greater value for the land as zoned, for in• 
stance, for residential use, but that response merely frames the ques-
tion for a regional approach rather than answers it. Economic loss 
is esentially immaterial to the question whether a prohibition bears 
a relation to the public health, safety, or welfare and is therefore 
valid under the police powers. 
Two distinct needs for land-use controls are thus evident: the 
need for a more cohesive metropolitan or regional framework; and 
the need for the introduction into the judicial decision-making 
process of those values that do in fact serve the general welfare as 
that term is defined in the context of modern urban society. It 
would obviously serve little purpose merely to elevate existing paro-
chial values to a higher level. The criticism of the typical zoning 
12. For a more extended discussion of these categories, see Becker, Municipal 
Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1. 
13. A thorough discussion of the legal and theoretical bases of the urban plannin~ 
functions is found in Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 
CoLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958). Professor Dunham states: 
... it is this impact [upon the noneconomic public welfare] which defines the re• 
lation of the city planner to the operating departments of government and to the 
private landowner. Because of this external impact (beneficial or detrimental) it 
1s possible that a less efficient or more costly location of a land use may, in terms 
of net community benefit, be more advantageous to general welfare than the most 
efficient and economical site . . • . 
Id. at 655-56. 
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process as made by Ukeles is particularly appropriate m this con-
text: 
[B]oth environmental and spatial goals [ of zoning] are curiously 
lacking in general concern for the particularly urban qualities of en-
vironment and space. None of the environmental goals reflect any 
direct concern for the quality of communication and social and eco-
nomic interaction that is pivotal in urban life. Similarly, none of the 
goals suggests any direct concern for the role of space in such inter-
actions. The goals and supporting structure of maps and regulations 
may intend such concern, but the goals do not explicitly express it. 
Thus, zoning goals, whether progressive, protective or negative, are 
essentially aimed at a level of social amenity and economic benefit 
without recognizing basic attributes of urban social and economic 
reality.14 
While the control of land uses has passed from the individual 
to the community, the community has persisted in using its powers 
to accomplish essentially private ends such as neighborhood protec-
tion, the enhancement of property values, and the preservation of 
social amenities. Consequently, these community interests as reflected 
in zoning decisions often have been at odds with the interests of 
the people of a larger region or the state in general. 
B. The Alternatives 
Even assuming the seriousness of the impact of land parochialism, 
some reformers argue that the matter will better be solved by non-
judicial action. The commentators suggest many alternatives, ranging 
from legislative metropolitanization of zoning15 to a metropolitan 
or regional government with zoning powers.16 Some have also sug-
gested that land-use controls affecting other municipalities be placed 
in the hands of a state agency17 or at least that local zoning be re-
quired to follow a regional plan containing essentials for area-wide 
development.18 Other proposed legislative solutions include the in-
creased use of flexible (non-Euclidean) zoning devices,19 the use of 
14. J. UKELES, supra note 3, at 27 (emphasis added). 
15. See Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan and New Jersey: A Comparative 
Study, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1171 (1965); Sturgis, Metropolitan Boston-A Fresh Approach, 
3 PORTIA L.J. 131, 174 (1968). 
16. See Cunningham, supra note IO. 
17. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 225, 220 
A.2d 97, 104 (1966) Oustice Francis, dissenting); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in 
Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957). 
IS. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PRon. 353 (1955); Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 
1154 (1955); Note, Comprehensive Plan Requirement in Zoning, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 
342 (1961). 
19. Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 DICKINSON L. REv. 109 
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extraterritorial zoning powers in the central cities,20 or the use of 
"performance standards" rather than "use" as the zoning guideline.21 
In spite of these many suggestions, it is obvious that problems of 
regionalism in land-use controls will continue to be a judicial prob-
lem for some time to come. Although many legislative solutions 
have been proposed, it is far from certain that they will be imple-
mented by state legislatures. Moreover, it is not clear whether courts 
can escape dealing with questions of regionalism under much of the 
proposed legislation or whether the questions will simply be pre-
sented to them in another form. It would seem to be a not-too-
conservative guess to say that the problems of regionalism and paro-
chialism will be handled by the judiciary, for the foreseeable future 
at least, and that the courts will of necessity muddle unwillingly 
through the legislative void.22 
On the other hand, it is fair to say that at least certain aspects 
of regional land-use problems truly are judicial problems and are 
properly resolved by the courts. One commentator has expressed 
this view: 
There can be no doubt that the courts possess a weapon of consider-
able force in judicially reviewing zoning ordinances, and that the 
imposition of a duty to accept into local planning and zoning philos-
ophies decisions which have been communally made elsewhere, either 
by municipalities or by some form of regional planning commission, 
may well come in the end from the courts and not from the legisla-
ture.23 
It is important to realize that the work the courts do in the 
zoning area will have a lasting impact upon our urban environ-
ments. Even when the courts must act in an interim capacity for 
lack of effective legislation, that course of judicial operation may 
lead to the development of an area in such a way that it cannot be 
readily corrected by subsequent legislative solutions. If housing is 
(1963); Comment, Zoning-The Floating Zone: A Potential Instrument of Versatile 
Zoning, 16 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 85 (1966); Note, The Administration of Zoning Flexi-
bility Devices: An Explanation for Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 MINN. L. REv. 973 
(1965); Note, Non-Euclidean "Zoning": Its Theoretical Validity and Practical Desir-
ability in Undeveloped Areas, 30 U. CIN. L. R.Ev. 297 (1961). 
20. See Becker, supra note 12. 
21. See Cunningham, supra note 10. 
22. Id. See also Dodds & Elenowitz, Planning Legislation: 1966-1967, 34 J. AM. !Nsr. 
PLANNERS 312 (1968); Note, Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 
600 (1965). 
23. B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1961). See also the 
concurring opinion of Justice Hall in Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-
Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 218, 220 A.2d 97, 101 (1966). 
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forced to locate in one place rather than another, or if a school is 
forced into another community, or if only large homes are to be 
built within a community, the long-range effects will be lasting 
monuments to judicial decisions made in the near future. Thus, 
even if judicial decisions constitute only a "holding action," that 
action must be well inspired if for no other reason than to avoid 
irreparable harm to a community or a region. 
Unfortunately, however, judicial action in the area of regional 
land-use controls has proven unreliable, and recent decisions appear 
shallow and in need of a doctrine. The rubric of regionalism that 
is currently in vogue is hardly a solution. It is an interesting com-
mentary that judicial regionalism has produced at best one decision 
in which local controls were invalidated on the basis of the needs 
of the larger region in which the community was located.24 In hopes 
of synthesizing a much-needed reasoned approach to regional zoning, 
this Article will explore both the means by which the judiciary can 
act, and the ways in which courts have acted in certain land-use 
areas of special concern, and by drawing on this experience will in-
dicate a suggested path for the future. 
III. THE REGIONAL EXPERIENCE-METROPOLITANIZATION 
GONE AWRY 
It is important at the outset to distinguish between the two 
types of zoning situations in which courts may be moved by regional 
considerations. The first involves an ordinance that is claimed to be 
invalid because of its effect vis-a-vis particular property. In this 
situation, the owner claims loss of value of his land, which, he 
alleges, constitutes a taking without compensation. The claim is 
that the reduction in value is suffered with no benefit to the public, 
or, if a public benefit is shown, that the operation of the ordinance 
upon the owner is too onerous and burdensome. 
The second, and more important, situation is that in which an 
ordinance is claimed to be invalid because its terms bear no reason-
able relation to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. The 
property owner making this challenge need not show any financial 
loss. The right at stake here is the right to the unfettered use of 
one's property, subject only to limited interference for the common 
good. 
A sort of regionalism has grown up in each of these situations: the 
24. National Land &: Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 71-79 infra. 
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first, concerning the effect upon properties located adjacent to a 
zoned parcel but across a municipal boundary; the second, concern-
ing an internal situation within the zoning community the effect 
of which is measured by external criteria. 
A. The Contiguous Uses 
It is a familiar rule that a parcel of property may be rendered 
unusable by a zoning ordinance if the ordinance precludes any 
reasonable use of the property in light of a pre-existing adjacent 
use.25 The police power, however, does not allow a municipality to 
render land wholly unusable through zoning unless that result is 
necessary for the public well-being.26 Although the recent case of 
Consolidated Rock Products Company v. City of Los Angeles21 may 
herald a modification of this traditional rule,28 it is still clear that 
an excessive diminution of value will not be allowed when a reason-
able zoning alternative is available with no adverse consequence to 
the public welfare.29 The injection of regionalism into this problem 
area has caused the rule of excessive diminution to be applied to 
situations as they exist in fact-even though the truly relevant 
factors exist across municipal lines.30 When the nature and character 
of adjoining property is material to the validity of the ordinance in 
question, it is immaterial that the adjoining property is located out-
side the municipality.31 
25. A thoughtful discussion is presented in Spanich v. City of Livonia, 355 Mich. 
252, 94 N.W.2d 62 (1959). 
26. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 
(1927). 
27. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 
(1962). The case is critically reviewed in Note, Constitutional Law: Zoning: Deprivation 
of All Economic Use Without Compensation, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 896 (1962). 
28. If Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (see text accompanying note 
26 supra), is read to limit the taking of all value through the operation of a zoning 
ordinance, then, indeed, Consolidated Rock Products, which held that a taking of 
practically all value was permissible even though reasonable minds could differ on the 
question of necessity, would appear to presage a modification. Nectow, however, should 
be read somewhat more narrowly to prohibit onerous depreciation of value only in 
those situations in which the ostensible benefit to the public well-being is minimal or 
of no consequence. 
29. The operation and limits of the police power in this regard are thoroughly ex-
plored in Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
30. Schwartz v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785 
(1956); Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963); 
Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 22 App. Div. 2d 895, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 
(1964). 
31. LaSalle Natl. Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill.2d 253, 122 N.E.2d 519 (1954); 
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Benvyn, 1 Ill.2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953). See also Whitting-
ham v. Village of Woodridge, 111 Ill. App. 147,249 N.E.2d 332 (1969). 
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A now-famous statement of this doctrine of marginal regionalism 
is that of the New Jersey supreme court in Borough of Cresskill v. 
Borough of Dumont.32 The defendant borough rezoned a parcel of 
land from residential to commercial. The property bordered on three 
other municipalities including the plaintiff borough, which chal-
lenged the rezoning on the ground that the commercial classification 
was inconsistent and unharmonious with the adjoining uses of the 
neighboring municipalities. Although the decision contains sweeping 
language about regional considerations, much of this dicta appears 
to be unnecessary. In holding that extramunicipal uses are relevant 
to the validity of a zoning ordinance, the court stated that zoning 
does not end at municipal boundaries and that 
[s]uch a view might prevail where there are large undeveloped areas 
at the borders of two contiguous towns, but it cannot be tolerated 
where, as here, the area is built up and one cannot tell when one is 
passing from one borough to another. Knickerbocker Road and 
l\fassachusetts Avenue are not Chinese walls separating Dumont from 
the adjoining boroughs.33 
Although the logic of these statements is unreproachable, their 
precedential import is weakened by the ultimate holding in the 
case. The parcel in question in Dumont was spot zoned for com-
mercial use. Thus the question was whether such spot-zoning was 
legal under state law. A New Jersey statute required that zoning 
be in accordance with a comprehensive scheme,34 and that fact, the 
court held, precluded such spot zones. The other major point in the 
case-that the neighboring municipality has standing to challenge 
the rezoning-is likewise merely unnecessary dictum since the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey was able to reach all of the substantive is-
sues by virtue of the fact that some of the plaintiffs resided within the 
defendant borough. Thus, the court never did reach the interesting 
standing questions. 
In Forbes v. Hubbard,35 the plaintiff challenged the classification 
of his land for residential use as being unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances because commercial properties existed across the road 
in an adjoining municipality. The court held that "conditions as 
they exist" determine the reasonableness of the ordinance as it is 
applied to a particular parcel, and that it is immaterial that those 
32. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). 
33. 15 N.J. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445. 
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55•32 (1967). 
35. 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932). 
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conditions are extraterritorial.36 In Forbes, as in the decision in 
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington,37 extraterritorial factors were con-
sidered in assessing the question of public benefit accruing from a 
restriction on a single property owner who was situated on the 
border of the municipality and who was faced with contiguous land 
uses in an adjoining municipality that rendered his parcel un-
desirable as zoned. But to read these cases as a broad limitation on 
local zoning powers would be to say that local government may not 
draw sharp lines between residential, industrial, and commercial 
districts. If carried to its logical extreme, such a proposition would 
mean the end of zoning as it is currently practiced, unless buffer 
zones or tapering uses could be provided.38 However, a meaningful 
principle may be gleaned from these cases--that, in assessing the 
effect of a zoning enactment upon a particular parcel, the effects 
may be considered as they exist in fact. The judiciary need not 
"modestly avert its gaze once it has arrived at municipal bound-
aries."39 
While these border situations definitely represent a type of 
regionalism, the results are hardly surprising. If a property owner 
can show that his land has been rendered unusable by an ordinance, 
of what significance is it that this result derives from a source 
external to the community? From a doctrinal standpoint, these cases 
seem no different from those in which the relevant factors derive 
wholly from within the zoning municipality. One need not reach 
the conclusion that the border cases herald the adoption of a judicial 
doctrine of regionalism; indeed, such a conclusion may be unwar-
ranted. These cases do not demonstrate local interests giving way to 
a greater good, but rather the fact that no matter what the interest 
involved, the zoning authorities may not destroy all of a man's use 
of his property without at least a substantial showing of public 
benefit.40 
26. 248 III. at 176-77, 180 N.E. at 771. The court stated that "in applying the test 
whether such ordinance is based on the public good, the considerations are not the 
comparative powers of neighboring villages, but conditions as they exist." 348 Ill. at 
177, 180 N.E.2d at 771. 
37. 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427,245 N.Y.S. 819 (1931). 
28. See, e.g., Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 
242, 154 N.W.2d 644 (1967). 
29. B. POOLEY, supra note 23, at 25. 
40. Sax, supra note 29, at 36. 
In a well-known article, Professor Charles Haar states that, along with extraterritorial 
zoning powers and nonresident standing, allowing a municipality to zone based on con-
ditions in an adjoining municipality is a significant expansion of regionalism. Haar, 
supra note 17, at 527. It is suggested by this writer that that is too big a name for too 
minor an achievement. 
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The more important contribution of the "border cases," and 
that which will play a greater future role in the development of 
meaningful metropolitan land-use controls, is the liberalization of 
standing requirements. In Koppel v. City of Fairway,41 nonresidents 
protested a rezoning of border property in the defendant city. In 
holding that the nonresidents should have been allowed to file pro-
tests against the rezoning, the court stated: 
It is true that even though two of the plaintiffs are located in an area 
just beyond the boundaries of the defendant city of Fairway they 
have, as abutting owners to the city, benefitted [sic] from the past 
zoning ordinance and are now directly and harmfully affected by the 
rezoning ordinance. As property owners they are entitled to the en-
joyment of their property.42 
In keeping with this matter-of-fact approach to the border situ-
ations, the court in Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Company43 granted 
a group of nonresidents the right to intervene in an action to set 
aside the rezoning of a border parcel. Unfortunately, this ad hoc 
approach that characterizes the border cases offers little assistance 
to the courts in defining internal uses that affect neighboring com-
munities in terms of policy impact. 
B. External Considerations Bearing on Internal Decisions 
It may safely be stated that with perhaps the one exception noted 
earlier,44 the doctrine of regionalism has been employed by courts 
to sustain exclusionary local ordinances rather than to require a 
municipality to accept a share of external burdens. Considering that 
the Supreme Court in Euclid foresaw at least some limitations on 
local zoning powers vis-a-vis regional or metropolitan interests, 
modern regionalism would appear to go even further than 
Euclid in permitting purely local interests to control those 
41. 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962). 
42. 189 Kan. at 714, 371 P.2d at 116. 
43. 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963). Indeed, Roosevelt portends interesting 
developments of the standing issue in such cases. In Roosevelt the resident petitioners 
were not allowed to intervene on the ground that their interests were already represented 
by the city attorney. Obviously, no such claim could be made on behalf of the non• 
residents. Unless the neighboring municipality decides to undertake legal action, it 
would appear that any right to intervene that may exist belongs to the disgruntled 
property owners in their individual capacities. 
Similarly, in Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. New 
Haven County 1955), a Connecticut court found that a statutory requirement that the 
zoning commission consider extramunicipal factors gives nonresidents standing to seek 
judicial review of the commission's decision. See also Whittingham v. Village of Wood-
ridge, Ill Ill. App. 147, 249 N.E.2d 332 (1969). 
44. See text accompanying note 24 supra. 
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of the region. It is a ~istake to regard- the Euclid decision as a 
product of "rural America," not purporting to cope with the same 
quality of problems as now confront modem metropolitan Amer-
ica. 45 Alfred Bettman, a zoning pioneer and author of the amicus 
curiae brief in the Euclid case,46 subsequently ·wrote: 
This passage in the opinion [the caveat quoted earlier47] is note-
worthy in that it presents the conflict not as one between the individ-
ual and the community, but rather as between different communities, 
different social groups, or social interests, which is, when profoundly 
comprehended, true of all police power constitutional issues.48 
Even under the broadest reading of the statement in Euclid that 
"people acting through their democratic institutions are entitled to 
adjust traditional property rights to improve their community en-
vironment,"49 one must recognize the logic of Bettman and of the 
Euclid opinion itself that this democratic process may be subject to 
larger policy limitations-that is, one can at least contemplate situ-
ations in which local interests should yield to broader metropolitan 
or regional ones. But regionalism in the courts seems to have yielded 
instead a rule permitting exclusionary practices probably not imag-
ined by the Court in Euclid. It is interesting, moreover, that local 
interests have thereby been substantially increased rather than cur-
tailed or required to yield to a greater public good as a matter of 
substantive due process. 
Probably the leading case of those purporting to employ regional 
considerations is Duffcon Concrete Products, Incorporated v. Bor-
ough of Cresskill,50 in which the court sustained an ordinance that 
served totally to exclude industrial uses from the defendant borough. 
In an oft-quoted phrase, the New Jersey supreme court held that 
the most appropriate use of property depends not only upon the con-
ditions within the municipality, "but also on the nature of the entire 
45. This notion is a popular misconception. A careful reading of the Euclid deci-
sion will reveal that the problems of the Cleveland metropolitan area are different from 
those existing in modem metropolitan communities in quantity of activity only, rather 
than in quality of problems encountered. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22. 
46. Brief for Natl. Conference on City Planning, Ohio State Conference on City 
Planning, Natl. Housing Assn., and Mass. Fedn. of Town Planning Bds. as Amicus 
Curiae, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
47. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
48. Bettman, The Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Euclid Village Zoning Case, in CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 51, 55 (A. Corney 
ed. 1946). 
49. Mixon, Jane Jacobs and the Law-Zoning for Diversity Examined, 62 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 314, 346 (1967). 
50. I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). 
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region in which the municipality is located and the use to which the 
land in that region has been or may be put most advantageously."51 
The Duff con case dealt with a municipality attempting to exclude 
certain undesirable uses rather than a municipality being asked to 
carry its share of regional burdens. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that subsequent cases have used the reasoning of Duffcon to justify 
the most invidious forms of social and economic protectionism. Inso-
far as Euclid sustains the right of a local entity to determine its own 
destiny, Du/Jeon is consistent with it and, indeed, serves greatly to 
expand that local prerogative. But if Euclid is read to imply a 
regional limitation on local powers, then Duffcon tends to read out 
that limitation. The holding of Duff con simply seems to be that a 
municipality may exclude any use that is, is thought to be, or that 
may become undesirable-so long as there is other land available 
for that use within the geographic region. 
Predictably, Du/Jeon was cited as authority in Lionshead Lake, 
Incorporated v. Wayne Township, 02 in which the court sustained a 
minimum-square-foot living-area requirement. This minimum-living-
area requirement was directly related to the requirement that only 
houses costing a stated minimum price could be built anywhere 
within the twenty-five-square-mile township. Chief Justice Vander-
bilt, the author of the Duff con opinion, wrote again for the majority 
in Lionshead, stating, "[i]t requires as much official watchfulness to 
anticipate and prevent suburban blight as it does to eradicate city 
slums."53 
Duffcon and Lionshead represent the gamut of how judicial 
regionalism has been applied by courts-from the useful consider-
ation of relevant external factors in making substantive internal 
decisions in Du/Jeon, to the erection of a social and economic barrier 
around the zoning municipality in Lionshead. It is evident that 
judicial cognizance of external considerations in zoning cases has 
not resulted in meaningful regional cooperation or planning because 
the natural inclination of each contiguous community-being con-
cerned with its own protection-is to zone its own land to avoid 
becoming a refuse heap of undesirable uses. Each community could 
therefore look to vacant land in the other to justify virtually any 
zoning decision. As Professor Haar wrote regarding the Lionshead 
case: 
51. I N.J. at 513, 64 A.2d at 350. 
52. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952). 
53. 10 N.J. at 173, 89 A.2d at 697. 
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The New Jersey court substituted shibboleths for reasoning, and 
used liberal shibboleths to attain an illiberal result-a decision 
which can only still further distort the problems arising from the 
complex relationship of city and country.54 
To be sure, as Professor Haar points out, this so-called regional-
ism is, in effect, a license for exclusion; but it is difficult to see the 
"liberal shibboleth" involved. In response to Harr's analysis, Nolan 
and Horack55 defended the Lionshead decision as being a regional 
decision in the spirit of Duff con and Borough of Cresskill v. Borough 
of Dumont56 in that the zoning municipality was looking outside 
its own boundaries for guidance in its internal decisions. They 
further stated that the court could not help but sustain such a prac-
tice: 
Had it [the court], as Professor Haar would wish, used a reciprocal 
idea of "localism" to declare the ordinance unconstitutional it would 
have overstepped the bounds of the judicial function. The use of 
regionalism to uphold legislative action is one thing, to strike it 
down, quite another.51 
The logical extension of the Nolan and Horack argument, and 
that of the New Jersey court, is that the more metropolitanized an 
area becomes, the greater becomes the ability of any municipality 
within the area to exclude certain uses. The reason for this con-
clusion is evident: the more communities that may be considered 
in the internal decision-making process of the zoning community, 
the greater likelihood there is that it can find some suitable land for 
the use outside its municipal boundaries. Obviously as society be-
comes more and more complex and urban areas become more inter-
twined with social and economic realities, the alternative-location 
argument begins to take its toll on people instead of merely on build-
ings. At that point, rather than placing an emphasis on what kind of 
a house will be built within the community, the "regional" zoners 
will be determining who may live, work, or play in the particular 
community. Moreover, there remains the problem of determining 
54. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. 
L. REv. 1051, 1063 (1953). 
55. Nolan &: Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Mir.inum Space Require-
ments, 67 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1954). 
56. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra. This 
case was also authored by Chief Justice Vanderbilt. 
57. Nolan &: Horack, supra note 55, at 984-85 (emphasis added). Professor Haar's 
rebuttal to the Nolan and Horack article is found in Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning 
for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1954), discussed in text accompany-
ing note 81 infra. 
March 1971] Land Use-Toward a Judicial Attitude 671 
which land uses are of such great benefit to the public that elimi-
nating potential locations therefor proves inimical to the general pub-
lic welfare. This question is merely begged by the statement in the No-
lan and Horack article that New Jersey saw fit to vest the zoning power 
in local government. 58 That argument is valid for an analysis of the 
validity of governmental delegations and scope of such powers, 59 but 
it is irrelevant to the question whether property rights are being in-
vaded for the public's health, safety, or general welfare. There is 
some exercise of power that is constitutionally impermissible, whether 
it be accomplished by the state or its local laboratories. The role of 
the courts in this sphere is greater than merely to bow to the local 
planning judgment-it is to ascertain those instances in which pri-
vate rights have been reduced without commensurate public benefit. 
As a constitutional matter, the courts must bend to larger needs. 
Unfortunately the so-called regional cases do not respond to 
this question. Although a limited type of regionalism has been em-
ployed in certain cases, as is discussed below,60 the principles have 
not emerged as judicial doctrine. The problem lies in the consider-
ation of external factors-whether the zoning municipality may con-
sider such factors, whether it should consider such factors, or whether 
it must do so. So far, the articulated regional doctrine has been 
limited to the first and possibly the second category, but has not in-
cluded the "must" category. In Kunzlerv. Hofjman,61 the New Jersey 
supreme court brought the principle of true regionalism to the 
brink of fruition. The municipality in that case granted a variance 
to a hospital, and residents opposed the grant. Under New Jersey 
statutes a variance is authorized whenever "special reasons" exist 
and it can be granted without detriment to the surrounding com-
munity. 62 The court held that "special reasons" include those cir-
cumstances in which a variance is granted for the purpose of 
promoting the public welfare. In finding that the zoning board 
58. Nolan & Horack, supra note 55, at 985. 
59. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 382 Mich. 373, 172 N.W.2d 
382 (1969); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 4:41 
(1954); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 14:4: 
N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1955); Nelson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 862, 395 
P.2d 82 (1964). See generally C. RATHKOPF, THE I.Aw OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed. 
1969). 
60. Typically a regional approach has been used in diverse cases dealing with 
schools, hospitals, utilities, churches, and other such special uses. See notes 102-04 infra 
and accompanying text; Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations 
on Municipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962). 
61. 48 N.J. 277, 225 A.2d 321 (1966). 
62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39(d) (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1969). 
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properly looked outside its boundaries to find a regional need for 
hospitals, the court held: 
A municipality may look beyond its own borders for zoning pur-
poses and recognize legitimate regional needs [citing Duff con]. It may 
provide cooperatively for the needs of neighboring communities as 
well as its own .... Although municipalities in their consideration 
of use variances have not yet been compelled to recognize values 
that transcend municipal lines, they certainly should be encouraged 
to consider regional needs and be supported by the courts when they 
do so for sound reasons. 63 
In light of the fact that the Kunzler decision was based on the 
finding that "another such hospital for the treatment of mentally 
disturbed persons furthers the public welfare,"64 it is difficult to see 
how, for instance, the Lionshead rationale could be used to exclude 
such a beneficial use from the community. The court in Kunzler did 
not, however, reach the question whether the municipality must con-
sider such external factors because, in that case, the municipality 
evidently did so of its own volition. It should also be noted that in 
Kunzler, regional considerations were again employed to sustain local 
action. 
Typically, the Kunzler case notwithstanding, in the courts region-
alism has been virtually synonymous with exclusionary practices05 
and laissez faire.66 Whether the doctrine was originally intended to 
have this effect is open to conjecture, although it must be presumed 
that Justice Vanderbilt was consistent in speaking for the New Jersey 
court in Duffcon and Lionshead. Creating an exclusionary doctrine 
does not appear to have been the intent of the Euclid court nor of 
the Massachusetts court in Simon v. Town of Needham/•t in which 
the court held the Euclid caveat to be controlling in Massachusetts, 
although inapplicable to the particular case. On the other hand, 
exclusionary practices do seem to have been a major consideration 
of the court in the much-cited case of Valley View Village v. Proffett: 68 
63. 48 N .J. at 287, 225 A.2d at 326. 
64. 48 N.J. at 286, 225 A.2d at 326. 
65. See, e.g., Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.'W .2d 397 (Mo. 1963) 
(rezoning for shopping center denied because of other land within region); Fanale v. 
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958) (exclusion of apart-
ment houses sustained on principle of Duffcon); Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood 
Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (Super. Ct. 1951). 
66. Cribbet suggests that the progression from individually oriented property rights 
to publicly oriented rights presents the progression, insofar as zoning is concerned, 
from laissez faire to savoir-faire. Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law of Land Use. 
50 IOWA L. R.Ev. 245,277 (1965). 
67. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
68. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955). 
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It is obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a large met-
ropolitan center, is not such a self contained community, but only an 
adventitious fragment of the economic and social whole .... The 
council of such a village should not be required to shut its eyes to 
the pattern of community life beyond the borders of the village it-
self.00 
It has only been in more recent decisions that the courts have 
verbalized the corollary to the regional exclusion cases-that regional 
needs must be satisfied somewhere within the region and that un-
desirable uses might have to be located within a municipality that 
does not desire their presence. 70 
The case that most nearly represents true regionalism in the sense 
of imposing upon metropolitan communities a duty or obligation 
to accept certain undesired uses is National Land & Investment Com-
pany v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment.11 In that case, the 
city of Easttown, a rural suburb of Philadelphia, zoned minimum 
lot sizes of four acres-ostensibly on the theory that city services 
such as water, sewage, and highway capacities necessitated a low-
density community. The court found, as a matter of fact, that such 
services were not then overburdened and refused to contemplate 
future stress in the event of an increase in population. In stating the 
judicial limitation on zoning powers-that they be used to promote 
public health, safety, or welfare-the court spoke in truly regional 
terms of the obligation of a community to absorb some of the 
regional burdens that surround it: 
The township's brief raises (but unfortunately does not attempt 
to answer) the interesting issue of the township's responsibility to 
those who do not yet live in the township but who are part, or may 
become part, of the population expansion of the suburbs. Four acre 
zoning represents Easttown's position that it does not desire to ac-
commodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township 
unless such admittance will not create any additional burdens upon 
governmental functions and services. The question posed is whether 
the township can stand in the way of the natural forces which send 
69. 221 F.2d at 418. 
70. The following quote from Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 
47 N.J. 2ll, 220 A.2d 97 (1966), is representative of such expressions: 
Hence the question will be whether a sound exercise of discretion [on application 
for a variance to allow a church school] requires that the school be permitted. 
In dealing with that question, the local authorities should consider the State 
policy favoring such exempt functions and the fact that regional needs must be 
met somewhere. 
47 N.J. at 217, 220 A.2d at 100 (emphasis added). 
71. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:655 
our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search 
of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not.72 
Amid this public-service language of the opinion, however, two 
nagging problems persist that tend somewhat to depreciate its value. 
The first is the fact that the city's argument concerning the straining 
muncipal facilities was makeweight since there were no present pres-
sures on city systems or services. This argument is similar to that 
found in many cases that do not extend zoning powers to dealing 
with future conditions within the municipality.73 One must wonder 
how the case would have been decided under a system, such as that 
in New Jersey, in which local legislators may plan ahead and contem-
plate future conditions in drafting ordinances.74 Since, as the court 
found in National Land & Investment, there was no real present 
threat of straining municipal services, the decision may be justified 
on the ground that the Pennsylvania courts will not approve a zoning 
ordinance unless its relation to the public welfare is based upon con-
ditions as they exist at the time the ordinance is passed. If this inter-
pretation of the case is correct, the language relating to acceptance of 
the burden of metropolitan living is welcome, but superfluous. 
Second, there is the factual determination in the opinion that 
the real motivation of Easttown in passing the ordinance in question 
was to reduce tax burdens-that in effect the city was attempting to 
erect economic barriers at its borders. Again the decision might well 
be rationalized on the ground that economic segregation is an im-
proper basis for exercising zoning powers when there is no other 
public-welfare motive to support the action. Numerous other cases 
involving economic segregation have ultimately permitted an ordi-
nance to stand on a showing of motivation related to the public wel-
fare.75 One must again wonder whether the decision would have been 
the same if there had been a more easily recognizable relationship 
between the ordinance and the welfare of the local inhabitants.76 
These problems greatly weaken the National Land & Investment 
72. 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. 
73. See, e.g., Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 
(1962); Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955). 
74. Compare the cases cited in note 73 supra with Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 
N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), and Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 
238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). For a comparison of the New Jersey and Michigan views see 
Cunningham, supra note 15. 
75. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); County 
Commrs. v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Board of County Supervisors v. 
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). 
76. See Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). 
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case insofar as its ratio decidendi may be viewed as espousing a mean-
ingful rule requiring municipal sharing of metropolitan burdens and 
at least some negative cooperation in resolving common land-use 
problems. Subsequently, the Pennsylvania court had the opportunity 
to clarify and follow the National Land & Investment rationale in a 
case in which the ordinance in question excluded certain mineral-
taking activities from within the zoning community.77 The court 
apparently chose neither to clarify nor follow that rationale. 
National Land & Investment, and its predecessor, Bilbar Construc-
tion Company v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township,78 while 
offering satisfying results, offer little in the sense of legal rationale. 
One must wonder whether the court would arrive at the same result 
and be moved by the same considerations in a more rural setting or 
whether the region did indeed require the land in satisfaction of over-
riding regional housing objectives.79 
C. Critique and Criteria 
If one perceives the regional approach as placing the municipality 
in the same relation vis-a-vis the region that the individual property 
owner is in vis-a-vis the municipality, it is clear that the regionalism 
doctrine as now applied has missed the mark by a wide margin. The 
present practice of permitting (but not requiring) reference to ex-
ternal needs and development has led to a greatly expanded local 
prerogative. This power is most typically used to exclude those uses 
77. In Exton Quarries, Inc. v. West Whitehead Township, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 
(1967), the court struck down an ordinance that prohibited quarrying anywhere within 
the borders of defendant township. While National Land 6- Investment might well 
have furnished authority for imposing a duty to accept the burden of producing re-
sources necessary for the people of the state, the opinion in Exton took another tack 
-according special consideration to the fact that valuable natural resources were 
involved. The decision is similar to that in City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 
52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929), which, although striking down such a prohibition, can 
hardly be considered a "regional" case. See notes 154-55 infra and accompanying text. 
Compare the Miller case with Township of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 
N.E.2d 243 (1945). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Governmental Regulation of 
Surface Mining Activities, 46 N.C. L. REv. 103 (1967). 
78. 393 Pa. 62, 76, 141 A.2d 851, 858 (1958) ("[M]inimum lot areas may not be 
ordained so large as to be exclusionary in effect and, thereby, serve a private rather 
than public interest.'). 
79. One commentator, in discussing the National Land & Investment case, has sug-
gested that 
[o]ne looks with doubt upon the decisions of local bodies, apt to be parochial 
or representative of vested interests, when these decisions affect outside interests 
adversely. The issue remains whether this doubt can be translated into a founda-
tion for legal action. 
Note, Regional Impact of Zoning, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1966). This critique 
is well founded, especially if one brings himself to look beyond the apparent natural 
justice of the National Land b Investment decision. Such criticism is invited by the 
Pennsylvania court by its statement, following the grandiose language of regionalism 
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deemed undesirable by pointing to otl_ier communities with space 
available for them. Ultimately, one community will end up having to 
allow the use, once all of the other communities have excluded it. 
While no case yet records retaliation by the repository community, 
the conclusion is inescapable that the doctrine is bound to foster such 
reaction. Professor Haar, in rebuttal to the Nolan and Horack discus-
sion80 of the Wayne Township case, stated: 
Perhaps the most harmful tendency of such restrictive ordinances 
would be to stimulate protective movements on the part of neigh-
boring communities, each anxious to avoid excessive immigration 
and the danger of absorbing those to whom neighboring towns refuse 
to grant building permits .... The court's claim that Wayne Town-
ship "lies in the path of the next onward wave of suburban develop-
ment" is an indication of its restrictive view of what constitutes the 
best regional industrial and population distribution .... A valuable 
concept such as regionalism which has much to contribute to the 
solution of community problems ought not to be abused to justify a 
local determination to exclude a regional burden.81 
As a judicial doctrine regionalism has not worked well-more 
often it has accomplished local rather than regional results. The prob-
lem lies in our continued adherence to the idea that the municipal 
community is the relevant public whose interests are at stake in zon-
ing controls. 82 Regionalism in a meaningful sense cannot be achieved 
until we are ready, and judicially equipped, to ascertain whether a 
particular desired use is in fact in the public's best interests. From a 
constitutional viewpoint, benefit to the regional public should be a 
requisite finding in order for a court to uphold a municipality's 
already referred to (see text accompanying note 72 supra), that "[a] zoning ordinance 
whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future 
burdens, economic or othenvise, upon the administration of public services and facili-
ties can not be held valid." 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. 
80. Nolan & Horack, supra note 55, at 984-85. See text accompanying notes 55-57 
supra. 
81. Haar, supra note 57, at 992-93. Indeed, the possibilities of retaliation are obvious. 
Logic demands the conclusion that what one can do, all can do. See, e.g., Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 301, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, 385 
(Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1955): 
If this Village could ban the proposed [high-tension electric] line entirely from 
its limits, so could every other municipality in the County. One municipality, 
especially where it uses particular public utility services, may not, so to speak, 
dump the undesirable facilities necessary to furnish such services upon the lap 
of an adjoining municipality. 
82. This is an inescapable conclusion from the reasoning of the Euclid case. See 
Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 158, 198 A. 225, 233 
(Sup. Ct. 1938): the measure of validity of a zoning ordinance is its effect upon the 
"public at large," meaning, "the entire community as a social, economic, and political 
unit." See Note, supra note 22, and cases cited therein. 
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interference with private-property ownership rights. While private 
rights are often at odds with community purposes and are at times 
considered to be a hindrance to orderly development of the com-
munity,83 such rights do provide a starting point for an assessment 
of the public interest. A private-property owner should be able to 
advance in court the inquiry whether his property rights are being 
interfered with for a legitimate purpose-one reasonably related to 
the promotion of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. This 
proposition is stated simply: 
. . . governmental power to interfere with general rights of land-
owners by zoning regulations restricting the character of use of prop-
erty is limited to restrictions which bear some substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare .... Under the 
guise of the police power legislatures may not impose unnecessary 
and unreasonable restrictions on the use of private property in 
pursuit of useful activities.84 
Yet, its application as an operative principle has been made difficult, 
if not impossible, because the courts generally have failed to identify 
the proper regional criteria to be considered in determining the pub-
lic interest. 
In light of the above discussion, four major criticisms of regional-
ism as it is practiced today may be stated. 
I. Regionalism Is Not Really Regional 
With the possible exception of the National Land & Investment 
case, no court has applied the regional approach except to sustain 
an action of interest to the zoning community. Courts still proceed 
on the assumption that zoning is a municipal function designed to 
care for local needs and to promote local interests. On the other hand, 
it has been suggested that unilateral action by a community in 
attempting to solve its own problems is the very antithesis of regional-
ism.85 To be sure, none could fairly make the claim that the doctrine 
has created any greater sense of awareness of the municipality as part 
of the larger community in which it is located or any sense of duty 
or obligation toward that larger body. Instead, municipalities still 
act in their mrn interests, and they are willing to look toward regional 
83. A learned discussion of the relation of private rights to property is found in 
Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HAsnNGS L.J. 
135 (1963). See also Cribbet, supra note 66. 
8·!. E. BASSE'IT, ZONING 77 (1936) (citing Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 
(1928)). 
85. Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Develop-
ment, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 13. 
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conditions only to the extent that what they see there may justify 
their decisions. 
Thus, so-called regionalism may as aptly be called "localism" in 
terms of its over-all effect on the relation of local to regional or metro-
politan interests. In general, so far as the battle lines have been drawn 
between proponents of local interests and those of regional needs, 
the former seem to have prevailed-at least when they have made a 
showing that the ordinance bears some relation to a recognized 
police power objective. The extent to which extramunicipal reference 
may or may not be limited may depend solely upon the cohesiveness 
of the area in which the municipality is located; the more commu-
nities that are included within the legitimate contemplation of the 
zoning officials, the greater the likelihood of successful exclusion. 
Thus, as metropolitanization increases, the power to exclude increases 
as well. There is little room for doubt that regionalism as practiced 
today is not regional at all, but merely a ploy for the extension of 
local powers to their ultimate end--complete Balkanization of uses, 
of economies, and, of course, of people.86 
2. Regionalism Is Too Broad a Concept To Help 
Decide Cases 
It is futile to think of regionalism as a zoning doctrine capable 
of aiding the meaningful decision of cases. As a concept, its breadth 
is exceeded only by the indiscriminateness of its application. "\,Vhen 
used as a catchword, regionalism tends to draw upon a larger body-
public and geographic area than the particular use in question may 
merit. When the use under consideration is of strictly local import, 
it is meaningless to invoke regionalism to ascertain whether it may 
be excluded from the community or forced to locate one place or 
another. For example, as to a controversy over a neighborhood grocery 
store or corner filling station, it would be easy to employ the catch-
word to find land available for such uses in other communities-all 
of which would be wholly immaterial to the local problem. One can 
perceive a certain irony in this logic-regionalism has become such 
a considerable force for exclusion that a court may have to resort 
to an analysis of local interests in order to limit the municipality's 
exclusionary powers. 
86. J. UKELES, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MUNICIPAL ZONING 44 (1964), notes that 
[s]ince zoning is directly aimed at the use of urban space, it is likely to have 
significant effects on the economic and social aspects of the urban environment. 
Zoning functions in the economic system apportioning costs and benefits and 
adjusting or supplanting market mechanisms. It acts as a social element, expressing 
certain values and negating others, and affecting the structure and form of urban 
social communities. 
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The breadth of the term "regionalism" would appear to include 
all the territory within a definable geographic area,87 apparently 
without regard to whether the use is even a concern of those to whom 
it is shifted. Geographic area is necessarily as arbitrary a concept as 
that of municipal boundaries since people live with little concern 
for either and base social and economic decisions on neither. To 
find land available for a hospital or a factory in some neighboring 
community is nonsensical unless, in fact, that community has a need 
for it. The examples of the local grocery or filling station are, no 
doubt, the illogic carried to its conclusion, but regionalism as a con-
cept offers little more in the way of a reasoned solution. It may 
safely be said, at the very least, that regionalism permits municipali-
ties to ignore socio-ecological considerations. It also no doubt tends 
to encourage local exclusionaries to include rural undeveloped land 
within the definition of the geographic region. 
3. Regionalism Is an Ad Hoc Determination 
The concept of regionalism has apparently been applied to certain 
classes of land uses that transcend municipal lines more than other 
classes of uses. In one case it is a factory and in others a shopping 
center, multiple dwellings, a hospital, or mobile homes. Yet it is not 
in every case involving such classes that one finds expression of extra-
munici pal considerations. Instead of being drawn into and made a 
part of the reasonableness criteria for the valid exercise of the police 
powers, regional considerations seem to have evolved into a system 
of special considerations that may or may not find application in the 
particular case depending upon the circumstances. If a parcel of 
property is zoned for residential use, for example, and the owner 
wishes to use it for a grocery store, it is not clear whether the regional-
ism principle would be applied. It would hardly seem responsive 
to the alleged invalidity of the ordinance to say that there are many 
lots available for groceries in some other community. Between the 
grocery store and uses such as a large hospital, there are innumerable 
uses that may affect people of the community and of the region in 
various ways. It is within this gradation of uses that the present re-
gional approach lacks any degree of certainty and universality. · 
Even within the use classifications in which one might expect the 
doctrine to find a fairly consistent application, regionalism is applied 
purely on an ad hoc basis. One obvious question that has already 
been alluded to is what constitutes a region for purposes of applica-
87. See, e.g., Dulfcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 
A.2d !147 (1949). 
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tion of the doctrine. Tied closely to this question is the problem of 
maintaining some relationship between the time of enactment of the 
zoning ordinance and the time of adjudication-that is, at what point 
does the alternative extramunicipal site have to be available for the 
undesired use? Does the municipality have to locate alternative land 
available for the use before it may enact its ordinance, or is the 
availability of such land an attorney's invention at the time of litiga-
tion? No matter what the answers to these questions may be,88 it is 
enough for present purposes that the concept of regionalism raises 
questions that cut deeply into the ability of the zoning municipality 
to predict with any accuracy how its ordinances will be treated by the 
courts. 
Under the present ad hoc application of regionalism, private 
rights, municipal interests, and regional needs are adjusted on a 
case-by-case basis with no governing principles emerging from the 
conflicts. Rather, these important interests are juggled on the happen-
stance of finding available land somewhere else or, worse, on finding 
a potentially undesirable situation within the region from which 
the municipality wishes to protect itself. This lack of a consistent 
pattern renders the concept of regionalism impotent in that it leaves 
courts without any doctrinaire basis for decision. 89 Institutions 
generally considered "essential" have been no less immune from this 
uncertainty and confusion in their attempts to locate within urban 
areas.90 
Not the least of the faults of ad hoc regionalism is the effect the 
88. An answer is suggested in Note, supra note 60, at 731: 
The critical question, however, not ruled on by the court [in Wilt'l'.'Yck School for 
Boys, Inc. v. Perry, 14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961)] involves the time 
at which the rule of "alternate unrestricted sites" should be applied: the date of 
purchase or the date of trial. It would seem both sensible and necessary to utilize 
the rule as being implicitly operative at the time of purchase, not at the time of 
trial. If the date of purchase is the applicable time, Wiltwyck made a reasonable 
choice when it declined to purchase land in two other communities which had 
already passed exclusionary zoning ordinances and completed the transaction in 
Yorktown where it was a permitted use when title passed. If the date of trial were 
the applicable time, then Wiltwyck, in making its purchase, would have to find a 
site which was not restricted and would not become so. And the court, in passing 
on the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted after the purchase, would have to 
decide whether there were alternate sites which were presently unrestricted and 
which would remain so. A rule which necessitates predicting the responses of each 
of many communities to Wiltwyck's to purchase places an impossible burden both 
on the purchaser and on the court. It seems much more sensible to make the 
time of title passage the cut off point determining whether there were alternate 
available unrestricted sites. 
One obvious question would arise when the user did not take title to the land but 
instead utilized a lease-back or land contract arrangement. 
89. See Note, Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 600 
(1965). See also note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
90. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L, REv. 515, 
524 (1957); Note, The Immunity of Schools from Zoning, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv, 644 (1963). 
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process has on the judiciary itself.91 The case-by-case use of a poten-
tially valuable vehicle for courts to limit local actions tends to impair 
the ability of the courts to apply the doctrine logically to new prob-
lems. The courts harbor a natural reluctance to make new law in 
the cases before them. Moreover, courts must share some concern for 
the expectations of litigants and the rules that they purported to rely 
on when they took their respective actions. These piecemeal efforts 
are not conducive to a planned society,92 nor do they lend credence 
to a constructive judicial role in resolving regional land-use contro-
versies. 
4. Regionalism Is Self-Defeating 
I£ one begins an appraisal of judicial regionalism hoping to find 
metropolitanization-meaning a sharing in law what is shared in 
fact-he will find that the doctrine has exactly the opposite effect of 
that intended. Zoning as an institution tends to reinforce the status 
quo by codifying social and economic groupings within the metro-
politan area.93 Those living in large homes do not desire the pres-
ence of smaller homes; those in single-family dwellings do not desire 
multiple dwellings; those in residential districts do not want the 
presence of industrial or institutional uses; and no one seems to want 
mobile homes nearby. Local zoning boards must at least recognize a 
community need for some of these uses. By employing a regionalism 
theory, however, municipalities may take advantage of a corollary 
doctrine that a community does not have to provide a cross section of 
uses within its borders94 and that, as a consequence, it may exclude 
unwanted uses when there is other land available for those uses 
within the geographic area. 
Thus, it does not take much imagination to envisage the fear of 
leaking zoning plans to other municipalities for fear of retaliatory 
measures before adjudication. This atmosphere, it would seem, is 
the very antithesis of what regionalism should attempt to create. 
Obviously, zoning as an exclusionary practice cannot continue for too 
long before every municipality within a metropolitan area will enact 
protective ordinances in order to avoid becoming the repository of 
every other community's undesired uses. Instead of fostering coop-
91. For a general jurisprudential viewpoint, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
51 (1964). 
92. See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1257 (1966). 
93. See J. UKELES, supra note 86, at 52. 
94. See, e.g., Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Fanale v. 
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958). 
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eration and a sense of shared concern for common problems regional-
ism tends to have exactly the opposite effect in practice. 
With each municipality attempting to implement its own 
solutions to its own problems in light of its own interests, the result 
is inevitably a Balkanization of communities within the metropolitan 
area, with its attendant effects upon the sociological and ecological 
qualities of urban life. It is not surprising that cases such as Dufjcon95 
and Profjett96 have become slogans for exclusionary tactics and have 
been applied to reach results contrary to results that one would 
suppose a genuine concept of regionalism would reach. Although 
on its face growing metropolitanization would lead one to theorize 
a greater public interest in land controls, municipalities have none-
theless remained individually oriented and regionalism has served 
to allow them to continue to be. 97 
There is a certain amount of realism or pessimism necessary in 
this area. It would appear a fact of metropolitan life that communi-
ties compete for harmonious and economically advantageous uses. 
Competition likewise exists to avoid those uses that are considered 
undesirable or unharmonious. Under present notions of regionalism, 
however, competition in metropolitan areas has tended to increase, 
rather than diminish.98 
D. Synopsis 
The four criticisms of regionalism set out above naturally sug-
gest criteria for a desirable judicial approach toward a more mean-
ingful doctrine of metropolitan land-use controls. The word "goals" 
should perhaps be used, rather than "criteria," since, after all, the 
questions are where the judiciary should be going in this area and 
what means are available for carrying it in the appropriate direction. 
The first and most obvious need is for a doctrinaire approach to 
urban land-use problems that is capable of consistent application 
from case to case. This is not to say that each case will be decided 
the same, but only that an approach must offer at least a modicum 
of predictability and universality. I£ we are to be committed to 
metropolitan land development, then we must likewise be committed 
to an approach that recognizes this interest in every case. In each 
95. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. 
96. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. 
97. See references cited in note 82 supra; Comment, Government Control of Land: 
Protecting the I-Know-It-When-I-See-It Interest, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 428, 441 (1967) 
(zoning is the embodiment of individual interests in land, which is at odds with the 
interests of the metropolitan community in land). 
98. See Note, supra note 89. 
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case the inquiry must proceed from analyzing the relation of the use 
in question to the metropolitan community in which the zoning 
municipality is located. We must avoid the hit-or-miss regionalism 
currently finding judicial expression and dedicate the judicial func-
tions to exploring zoning limitations from a consistent metropolitan 
or regional viewpoint. While cases may, on their facts, concern 
strictly local interests, regional interests, or something in between, we 
must achieve at least some measure of consistency in the basic ap-
proach to each case. 
Second, there is the ever-present danger that courts will be placed 
in the position of being forced to make substantive planning deci-
sions. Nothing could be more detrimental to the hopes for a well-
planned metropolis or to the efficacy of the judicial process.99 An 
approach that courts can apply to gauge the validity of local land-use 
decisions should have the quality of encouraging planning before 
the initial decisions are made.100 We must recognize the influence 
of judicial decisions upon the manner in which land is ultimately 
developed and their effect upon the local decision-making processes. 
The judiciary does tend to discourage some potential decisions from 
contemplation while indirectly favoring other decisions.101 More-
over, there is always the great potential for courts to give vitality to 
essential policies of urban life that are before them for consideration 
but that are missing from the zoning enactments.102 
It is important for courts to comprehend their role in the land-
use processes and to realize what effects a judicial pronouncement 
will have upon these processes at work. The courts must perceive 
the consequences of a decision in assessing its correctness-whether 
99. See Haar, supra note 90, at 530. 
100. The proposition is even stronger in the negative-that when individuals or 
municipalities cannot look to completion of their plans with any degree of certainty, 
there has certainly resulted a dissuasion from an initial planning process. Thus, 
Cribbet, supra note 66, at 277, suggests that what is needed is an administrative body 
to whom the respective parties can turn to find out which of their plans will be 
permissible. The theory is similar to that of the English Town and Country Planning 
Act of 1947, 10 &: 11 Geo. 6, c. 51., but Cribbet would not place that amount of control 
in the administrative body as the English place in the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government. See L. BLUNDELL & G. DORBY, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING 25 (1963). 
101. See Kaiser &: Weiss, Local Public Policy and the Residential Development 
Process, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 232, 248 (1967). See generally s. WILLHELM, URBAN 
ZONING AND LAND USE THEORY (1962). Professor Dunham suggests that this is the over-
riding characteristic of our planning theory-that we can only hope to induce the 
kind of development we desire by eliminating the alternatives available to the de-
veloper. However, as Professor Dunham also points out, the courts have not counte-
nanced land restrictions that effectively relegate the land to a single publicly desired 
use. Dunham, A. Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 650, 
663 (1958). 
102. See J. UKELES, supra note 86, at 63-64. 
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the decision will foster local parochialism or whether it will promote 
truly metropolitan interests. This sense of judicial introspection 
must, of course, find its expression through a recognized legal doc-
trine such as the relation of the exercise of the police power to the 
public health, safety, or welfare. At present there are some glitter-
ings of such introspective attitudes in special-use categories that pre-
sent inescapable intermunicipal consequences,103 but these piecemeal 
applications barely reflect a judicial awareness of the more general 
urban land-use problems. The courts must attain an acute awareness 
(as they have not in past regionalism cases) of whether a doctrine will 
further local planning, encourage planning consultation, create a 
sense of intermunicipal cooperation, or merely serve to create an 
armed metropolitan camp with each local decision bringing retali-
ation from neighboring communities. 
Finally, the judiciary must develop a filtration process by which 
the validity of the enactment is measured against only those interests 
that are truly affected by it. Just as some problems may be wholly 
local in nature,104 others may cross municipal lines without neces-
sarily involving the entire region. It is submitted that there is a 
spectrum of uses with a commensurate spectrum of definable publics. 
Those problems that are regional should not be subject to wholly 
local direction, but by the same token, it is useless and confusing to 
invoke the welfare of the public of a region to gauge wholly local 
decisions. Determining which decisions affect which public must be 
a prime consideration for any meaningful judicial doctrine that 
hopes to achieve an analytical review of land-use decisions. While for 
consistency such a doctrine should approach each problem by ana-
lyzing its impact upon the real public concerned, the measure of that 
103. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
104. Although the thesis shall be more fully developed below (see text accompanying 
notes 128-43 infra), it is perhaps useful at this point to distinguish between uses that 
are wholly local-that is, those that do not concern anyone outside of the municipality 
-and those circumstances in which, although the use itself has significant external 
impact, the regulation in question pertains only to local aspects of the use. Such a 
distinction was directly in issue in School Dist. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 
277, 283, 207 A.2d 864, 868 (1965): 
\Ve regard state-wide interest, and thus the area protected from local interference 
by statute, to be centered in, for example, the number of hours that children 
must attend school and the types and emphasis of courses that shall be presented 
to them. ·we see no inherent state-wide interest in the fact that certain school 
buildings, because of local problems of congestion, should be so situated that 
space is available for off-street parking, or even that, because of overcrowded 
conditions, each building should be of only a certain height, or that it should have 
a back yard of a certain depth. 
Compare Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grossman, 30 N.J. 273, 152 
A.2d 569 (1959) with Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 
233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). 
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impact, in assessing the validity of an ordinance, must of course 
vary with the circumstances of the use itself. 
Using these criteria one may begin to develop a judicial approach 
that will operate within the described parameters. The solution must 
first proceed with the question "Who is the public?" in order that the 
effect upon the public health, safety, welfare, or morals may properly 
be ascertained. 
III. THE ANTIPRESUMPTION: A POLICY APPRAISAL PROCEDURE 
Throughout the annals of modern zoning litigation there have 
always been certain classes of uses that have so obviously transcended 
local boundaries or have so obviously promoted the public well-being 
that they have received special attention from the courts.10:; Uses 
such as schools, hospitals, eleemosynary institutions, public utilities, 
the taking of minerals, and churches have generally required a show-
ing on the part of the zoning municipality that the exclusion of such 
uses is reasonably necessary for the public health, safety, or welfare.106 
Although a sense of true regionalism does exist concerning these 
specific use situations, there is nevertheless still present in these cases 
a marked lack of continuity. Thus, we need to move toward a notion 
of preferred policies rather than preferred institutions.107 One would 
hope that within the various decisions pertaining to the superior 
interests surrounding the so-called preferred institutions there is 
buried the seed of a universal judicial attitude that may find appli-
105. See note 60 supra; Haar, supra note 90, at 524. 
106. See Note, supra note 60, at 724-26: 
• • . courts have frequently recognized the necessity of protecting institutions 
which serve a larger public interest from the operation of local zoning ordinances. 
In so doing, they customarily utilize three techniques .... First, a court may feel 
impelled by reason of public policy to expand by construction one of the categories 
of permitted uses to include an apparently excluded party. Secondly, it may 
extend the governmental immunity possessed by a public institution to private 
institutions carrying out similar functions on grounds that no reasonable basis 
for differential treatment can be found. And third, it may invalidate an ordinance 
because a certain use is so essential to the public welfare that an ordinance which 
excludes it can bear no reasonable relation to the public welfare. The first two 
techniques have been used by courts in a variety of familiar statutory contexts and 
presents few novel issues. The third technique-which rests explicitly on con-
siderations of state public policy-represents, perhaps, the most accurate descrip-
tion of why courts respond to the claims of an excluded use. As such, it is significant 
both in itself and also as a rationale for the application of the other two techniques. 
Likewise, for present purposes it is the third category that represents the judicial 
limitation of local zoning powers. Analysis of this category offers the greatest likelihood 
of exposing those considerations (explicit or implicit) that courts can and do act upon 
to protect a property owner, institutional or othenvise, from arbitrary interference. 
In the attempt to evolve a generally applicable judicial attitude, these distinctions are 
highly relevant in separating the general theory from the specific case, and the statutory 
from the constitutional issues. 
107. See id. at 727. 
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cation in every zoning case. Such a distillation process does indeed 
yield an approach that is often unarticulated or, when articulated, 
is done so only in relation to the specific institution involved. 
The special-use cases proceed on the assumption that the 
battle lines are drawn between the prerogatives of the individual 
landowner and the police powers of the state; that while every owner 
of land has a duty to step aside in the public's interests, there is a 
corollary right not to be pushed aside except when the public's 
interest is actually at stake. Obviously, then, there is an initial in-
quiry regarding who this "public" is whose interests may compel 
restrictions upon an individual's right to use his property as he 
desires. Once the body public is identified, the interests of that 
public may be more clearly delineated and the effort to ascertain 
whether those interests are sufficient to justify a land-use restriction 
may become more fruitful. It is suggested that once the public's in-
terests are adequately identified, the same rationale that is applied, 
implicitly or explicitly, in the special-use cases, may give rise to an 
approach applicable to every zoning case. Such an approach will be 
truly regional in the sense of being a judicial limitation upon the 
local zoning powers of communities existing within a metropolitan 
matrix. Moreover, it is hoped that such a solution will be relevant 
in the noninstitutional cases as well, such as those involving housing 
and population density controls. 
A. The Shifting Public: "Who v. Whom?" 
Metropolitanization and a regional emphasis on land-use controls 
should shift the direction of the judicial inquiry from asking 
whether other land is available for a given use to whether a partic-
ular use restriction is in the interests of the public health, safety, or 
welfare. The change proceeds naturally enough from the passage of 
the Euclid case quoted at the outset of this Article108 indicating that 
there might be interests that so far outweigh those of the zoning 
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in 
the way. This statement by the Supreme Court heralds an approach 
that is truly regional in principle-it recognizes that certain uses 
may be of such significance to the well-being of the "area public" 
that more parochial interests would simply not be in the public's 
interests.109 From a more analytical viewpoint, there must be a shift 
108. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
109. In Note, supra note 79, at 1254, a basic line of police power analysis is 
suggested: 
.•. one can argue tbat to be valid as a police regulation, tbe ordinance must 
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in emphasis from viewing the conflict as the individual versus the 
municipality to viewing it as the municipality versus the region, 
with the individual's rights hinging on the outcome. 
For example, one may hypothesize an institution owning land 
that it desires to use for hospital purposes. That use, however, is 
prohibited by an ordinance under which the land is zoned for residen-
tial purposes. An owner relying on the regional argument must main-
tain that the relevant public health, safety, and welfare is that of the 
regional public, and that unless the municipality can show substan-
tial reason for the restriction, it should be considered arbitrary. In 
effect, such an argument envisages a matching of the local-interest 
factors against the detriment to the larger public from allowing the 
municipality to prohibit the use.110 What is suggested, of course, is 
that in such cases there is a balancing function carried out by the 
courts (articulated or not) in which local interests are weighed against 
the interests of the metropolitan community, the region, or the state 
itself.111 
It should be obvious that not every use involves the same interests 
on the part of the same public. Because of this factor, regionalism 
bear a reasonable relation to the "general welfare" of the state. Since the relevant 
"general welfare" which limits exercise of the state police power is the general 
welfare of the state, and since the state delegation of its police power must be 
at least as limited as the power itself, then the local exercise of the police power 
must be similarly limited. Thus a local exercise of the police power must bear a 
reasonable relation to the general welfare of the state. It is not only permissible 
but necessary for a court to go beyond the words of the enabling act and consider 
the elements forming this broader general welfare. In this expanded sense, general 
welfare would certainly encompass regional demand for high density land and 
how it is affected by local ordinances. 
Although this paragraph phrases with precision the police power confrontation at 
the local level, the conclusion reached that regional demands include high-density 
zoning is somewhat mysterious. It would appear that this analysis is often based on 
short-range metropolitan needs rather than on any longer-range planning evidence of 
what a region should be like. While it is obviously ill-considered to deny available land 
to those who might be able to utilize it, who is to say that having low-density, high-
economic-level communities is not also in the greater interests of the entire community? 
This Article does not purport to answer this question. The question involves a 
theory of the city that probably has not yet been propounded. 
The quoted paragraph is also illustrative of the proposition that enabling acts, as 
interpreted by the courts, may actually be attempting to delegate to the municipalities 
more power than exists in the state. To the extent that this is so, much of present 
zoning is subject to the taint of unconstitutionality. See B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND 
ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 98 (1961). 
110. See, e.g., Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 
342, 154 N.W .2d 644 (1967). 
Ill. Federal policies may also be relevant. Typically, however, when federal policy 
is involved the question is whether the federal government has pre-empted the field 
rather than whether the local regulation is reasonable in light of national policy. 
See, e.g., Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135 N.J.L. 549, 53 A.2d 164 (Ct. Err. & App. 
1947); Thanet Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 104 N.J. Super. 180, 249 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 
1969). 
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tends to become an unfortunate label when it is taken to refer to 
a public at large rather than to a theory of constitutional dimensions. 
There is in each case a group of persons who are affected by the use 
restriction and a group of others who, although within geographic 
proximity, may nevertheless be wholly disinterested in it. For ex-
ample, assume that suburb A, suburb B, and central city C are all 
mutually contiguous, and that A passes an ordinance requiring mini-
mum lot sizes of five acres. If suburb B is already a fairly stable and 
economically endowed community, it will no doubt more than wel-
come A's enactment. A group of potential migrants from C, however, 
might be seriously aggrieved by the enactment, seeing it as eliminat-
ing their most likely access to suburbia. B's attitude might be differ-
ent if it were less developed and generally favored more liberal 
zoning laws since then it would be obliged to take on the rather 
unprofitable low- or lower-middle-income housing function that A 
avoided. Assuming, on the other hand, that B is an established 
residential community and that A rezones its border areas for in-
dustrial use, at least some citizens of B will be adversely affected 
by the enactment while the citizens of C will probably be indifferent 
to it. 
While no social, ecological, or economic accuracy is claimed for 
the above illustrations, it should be obvious that to treat each case 
as a regional case is to lose sight of the real interests at stake. Before 
the court can proceed to effect any intelligent balancing of local 
and larger interests vis-a-vis a particular enactment, it is necessary 
for it to attempt to identify whose interests are competing with those 
of the zoning municipality. This step is certainly essential in terms 
of the procedure to be suggested herein,112 as well as for purposes 
of standing and intervention in any litigation.113 
Thus, in order to ascertain whether there are recognized external 
interests that may outweigh local interests, it is necessary to know 
whose interests they are. Because no two uses in any two cases will 
have identical consequences, the only intellectually honest way to 
proceed is through a device that is called, for want of a better name, 
a "shifting public," which is, in essence, a reasoned judicial calcula-
tion of who is in fact affected by a particular ordinance. The public 
in a given case may vary from the entire state to a neighborhood 
within the zoning municipality, and, of course, may ~e any of a 
112. See text accompanying notes 168-79 infra. 
113. Comment, Standing To Appeal Zoning Determinations: The "Aggrieved 
Person" Requirements, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1070 (1966). See also text accompanying notes 
41-43 supra. 
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number of variations in between. Through this qualitative analysis 
of the external impact of a zoning ordinance, we may begin to search 
out relevant policies that may influence a court's assessment of the 
reasonableness of a particular ordinance. Thus, identifying the shift-
ing public should be a first step in any metropolitan analysis. 
B. The Areas of Confrontation 
When courts approach the problem of a municipality attempting 
to exclude a so-called preferred institution, a strange chemistry seems 
to take place. The process is a shifting of the burden from the owner-
challenger to the municipality to show the reasonableness of the 
ordinance. Although it is generally accepted that courts will not 
interfere with the legislative process when there is a debatable ques-
tion concerning reasonableness, 114 this premise appears to undergo 
a transformation when local interests come into conflict with those 
of the external public.115 In reacting to these conflicts, when pre-
ferred institutions are involved, courts have been moved by various 
considerations of policy vis-a-vis the particular use in question. 
Courts have eradicated the presumption of validity, shifted the bur-
den of going forward onto the municipality, or even shifted the 
burden of proof of reasonableness to the zoning municipality. By 
analyzing these confrontations, it is possible to synthesize a principle 
that should be applicable to every case. Therefore, it will be more 
useful to depart from the traditional approach of determining judi-
cial attitude toward particular institutions and to look instead to 
the underlying policies that many uses share. 
I. State Constitutional Provisions116 
In Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake,117 the defendant munici-
pality enacted a zoning ordinance that had the practical effect of 
excluding schools and churches from the entire community. In 
assessing the reasonableness of this enactment, the Michigan court 
referred to the Michigan Constitution, which provided that "reli-
gion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government 
II4. See note 5 supra. 
II5. See Crawford, Zoning for Large Industrial Properties, 52 A.B.A.J. 646 (1966). 
ll6. The constitutional provisions here under consideration are those purporting 
to set forth basic state policies (such as in the preamble) without attempting to set out 
division of power between state and local governments. Such statements do not prevent 
local action in the area nor do they create a wholly local or statewide realm of action. 
In each case considered there is a legitimate basis for local action subject only to the 
requirement that the action be reasonably related to public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare. 
II7. 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952). 
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and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged."118 The court proceeded to strike down 
the ordinance as arbitrary and unreasonable, shifting to the munici-
pality the burden of proving the relationship between the enactment 
and the public health, safety, and welfare. It was obvious that the 
challenger made a prima facie case of unconstitutionality by showing 
that the organic law of the state favored schools and churches and 
that, ipso facto, the exclusion of such uses was not in the public's wel-
fare. The court stated: 
Hardly compatible is this with a presumption that exclusion of 
school and church from an entire municipality is conducive to pub-
lic health, safety, morals or the general welfare, a presumption which 
we decline to indulge. A thesis so inconsistent with the spirit and 
genius of our free institutions and system of government and the 
traditions of the American people will not be accepted by way of 
presumption, nor at all in the absence of competent evidence estab-
lishing a real and substantial relationship between the attempted 
exclusion and public health, safety, morals or the general welfare, 
and hence, the reasonableness and validity of the restriction upon 
use of private property as a legitimate exercise of the state's police 
powers.119 
Three striking features of the Mooney decision are immedi-
ately apparent: first is the strong language of basic democratic prin-
ciples at work, perhaps indicating the strength of the court's reaction 
to the question as one of first impression;120 second is the fact that 
the ordinance was held to be violative of due process and not in 
contravention of some other particular provision of the state consti-
tution; and third is the manner in which the court struck down the 
ordinance-on a failure of proof on the part of the municipality 
that its local policies were stronger than the "organic" policies of 
the State of Michigan. 
It would be impossible to square the Mooney case with the gen-
erally accepted notion that courts do not sit as super zoning boards121 
unless the theory of the case is that by reference to constitutional 
118. MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (1908). 
119. 333 Mich. at 394, 53 N.W.2d at 310. 
120. Such reaction is not unique to the Michigan court. In Ex parte Medinger, 377 
Pa. 217, 226, 104 A.2d 118, 123 (1954), a Pennsylvania court struck down an ordinance 
requiring a minimum-square-foot house size, stating, "[t]his ordinance flies in the 
face of our birthright of Liberty and our American Way of Life, and is interdicted 
by the Constitution." 
121. See note 5 supra. See also Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 
129 (1962). 
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policy the challenger has made out a prima facie case of invalidity 
that must be countered by the municipality in order to have its 
ordinance sustained as reasonable. Indeed, as the Mooney court 
stated, an ordinance that on its face flouts the organic policies of the 
state will not be entitled to a presumption of validity and may well 
result in a shift of the burden of proof, as well as the burden of going 
forward with the evidence, onto the municipality. Interestingly, the 
Mooney rationale does not erect a blanket prohibition against exclu-
sion of schools and churches, but rather puts the onus on the 
municipality to show the justification for such an exclusion. Such a 
procedure not only preserves a great deal of local initiative, but 
also tends to foster planning in the sense that municipalities must be 
able to justify their zoning decisions if they are challenged at a later 
time. One may speculate that if the Mooney rationale were extended 
to each zoning case in which such a prima facie case could be made 
out, a new era of municipal planning might ensue.122 
With speculation aside, however, Aiooney does suggest a means 
of dealing with intermunicipal needs even though the decision did 
not do so per se. Of doctrinal importance is the Michigan court's 
recognition that although the public involved was the local (munic-
ipal) public, the state's organic policies were still relevant at least to 
shift the burden of going forward to the municipality. 
Generally, courts have been reluctant to take the approach that 
state constitutional policies prohibit localities from dealing with 
various use situations.123 Such an inflexible premise has only found 
expression when courts have dealt ·with the first amendment impli-
122. What is cursorily suggested here is that while local legislators are avowedly 
dedicated to the protection of their constituents' interests, they are nonetheless entitled 
to a presumption of honesty and integrity in carrying out that function. On being 
faced with a statutory or constitutional policy of the state which, on advice of counsel, 
would seem to pose an impediment to the proposed enactment, legislators must at 
least consider more fully the planning basis for their action. Whether the threat of 
running afoul of state policies forces recourse to professional planners or consultation 
of the regional master plan, if one exists, or merely forces deeper thought, certainly it 
will have, in this regard, served a useful and needed function. See Strong, Planning 
and Zoning: The Pennsylvania Prospect, 35 PA. B.A.Q. 218 (1964). 
123. See Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 382 Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1968) 
(utilities): Roman Catholic Diocese v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 2ll, 220 A.2d 
97 (1966) (schools); Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grossman, 30 
N.J. 273, 152 A.2d 569 (1959) (churches); School Dist. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 
417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965) (schools). See generally Note, Constitutional Law-
Governmental Regulation of Surface Mining Activities, 46 N.C. L. REv. 103 (1967); 
Note, Application of Local Zoning Ordinances to State-Controlled Public Utilities and 
Licensees: A Study in Preemption, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 195; Note, The Immunity of 
Schools from Zoning, 14 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 644 (1963). 
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cations of excluding churches from a community.124 And even when 
the exclusion of a church has been held unconstitutional, courts have 
nonetheless recognized the power of municipalities to regulate 
churches. In Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,126 a rather traditionalist court was faced with two zoning 
ordinances that threatened to interfere with the construction of a 
church in a residential district. The first required a minimum set-
back from the street and the second required a certain number of 
offstreet parking spaces. Proceeding from a classical first amendment 
analysis, 126 the court sustained the setback requirement as being easy 
for the church to comply with and therefore not interfering with 
the right to worship. The offstreet-parking requirement, on the other 
hand, could not have been complied with by th~ church. In striking 
down this latter provision, the court found that any benefits it might 
have for the public health or safety were easily outweighed by the 
right to worship. 
While churches have received special treatment in zoning cases 
by virtue of the first amendment, a generally applicable rule may 
still be gleaned from those situations in which the reasonableness 
of the ordinance has been tested not against the constitutional right 
to worship, but against. the constitutional policies in favor of 
religious education and moral development of the people of the 
state. Such an organic policy permeates every reach of the state and 
its subdivisions. Thus, even though a court may determine that the 
relevant public is strictly local, the relevant state policy is nonethe-
less applicable. As in the Mooney and Decatur cases, the challenger 
should be able to establish the prima fade unreasonableness of the 
ordinance by reference to the applicable constitutional policies and 
at least enjoy immunity from zoning restrictions to the extent that 
the municipality cannot show a countervailing necessity that out-
weighs the impingement on the state policy.127 
124. See Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 172 N.E.2d 39 (1961) 
(unconstitutional to exclude churches from residential areas); Board of Zoning Appeals 
v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). In City of 
Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W .2d 415 (1944), the court held that the e.x-
clusion of churches was not reasonably related to the public welfare, being too fraught 
with the possibility of a first amendment violation. See generally Note, Churches and 
Zoning, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1428 (1957). 
125. 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). 
126. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
127. See Note, supra note 124, at 1431: "Many of the cases invalidating the exclusion 
of churches seem to place the burden on the zoning authorities to justify the exclusion. 
This is contrary to the usual rule that affords zoning ordinances and decisions a 
presumption of constitutionality." 
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2. Policies Founded in Statutory Provisions128 
In identifying state statutory provisions relating to preferred 
land uses, it is immediately necessary to distinguish policies founded 
in statutes that regulate and license certain land-use activities from 
those founded in statutes that encourage such uses as being in the 
public interest.129 Under the former type of provision, virtually any 
use may find some legitimation in a statute, especially the more 
dangerous or exceptional uses that traditionally require state license 
for operation; but mere legitimation must not be considered en-
couragement or a statement of policy. It is, of course, difficult to 
make such a distinction in the abstract and, by the same token, a 
single statute may contain elements of both categories. The impor-
tant point for purposes of the present analysis is that a legitimation 
-e.g., licensing-provision is not a statement of state policy bearing 
on the reasonableness of a local enactment unless there is within the 
statute a statement-express or implied-that the use in question 
furthers the public well-being. Probably the most accurate guide 
will be the preamble to the statutory provision. In order to demon-
strate prima fade unreasonableness of a local zoning restriction on 
such a use, the challenger must first show that the public interest 
involved is encompassed by the legitimating statute and, second, that 
the statute purports to establish a policy relevant to the public in-
volved. 
128. It is again necessary to distinguish statutory policies from statutory pre-emption. 
See note 116 supra. For purposes of this discussion it is assumed that local government 
has the authority to legislate in the area in question subject only to the constitutional 
limitation of reasonable relation to the public welfare. State statutes, however, although 
not supreme in the sense of pre-empting the field under regulation may, nonetheless, 
offer considerable guidance in discerning the reasonableness of a particular ordinance. 
The cases here under consideration arc those in which the courts have explicitly or 
implicitly referred to such statutory policies in order to assess the reasonableness of 
the local enactment. The distinction is made in Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 
382 Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1968), in which the Detroit Edison Company chal-
lenged a height restriction imposed by the defendant city that would have had the 
effect of limiting the height of its main transmission towers. The transmission line was 
being constructed pursuant to a grant of necessity by the Michigan Public Utilities Com 
mission, which had authorized the construction of eighty-foot-high towers across 
Wixom. The court held that the legislature had not vested exclusive power over the 
matter in the commission and that ,vixom was free, within the limits of reasonableness, 
to legislate in the field. In reversing the court of appeals on the question of the reason-
ableness of the height ordinance, the court indicated that the statutory language 
establishing the jurisdiction and functions of the commission are to be considered 
in assessing the reasonableness of the ordinance. A similar statement can be found by 
the New York court in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 
Misc. 295, !100, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379, !184 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1955). See Note, 1965 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 195, supra note 12!1. 
129. See note 106 supra. 
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In Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-
Kus,130 a local zoning ordinance prohibited the erection of schools 
in a residential district on the ground that the tax-exempt status 
of schools constituted a drain on municipal tax revenues. Upon re-
manding the case for determination whether a variance should be 
granted, the New Jersey court stated: 
Hence the question will be whether a sound exercise of discretion 
[on application for a variance] requires that the school be permitted. 
In dealing with that question, the local authorities should consider 
the State policy favoring such exempt functions and the fact that 
regional needs must be met somewhere.131 
Justice Hall, concurring, would have required that in order to 
prevent a tax-exempt institution from locating at a particular place, 
the municipality be required to demonstrate the harmful effects that 
would follow-that is, he felt that it is not within the zoning power 
to exclude such important and beneficial uses without some valid 
justification.132 Although the court did not reach the question of the 
presumption of validity, it would seem a fair assumption that the 
court would have, after a prima fade showing of a statutory policy 
favoring tax-exempt institutions, shifted the burden onto the munic-
ipality to show the relation of its enactment to the public welfare 
and to show that this relation would continue in the future. It re-
mains to be seen, however, which objectives will be deemed sufficient 
for the municipality to carry its burden. 
I£ this is a fair reading of the Ho-Ho-Kus case, one must ponder 
the future of such decisions as Dufjcon (excluding industrial uses 
from the community),133 Lionshead (minimum-house-size require-
ments),134 and Vickers (excluding mobile homes)135 in light of the 
130. 47 N.J. 211, 220 A.2d 97 (1966). 
131. 47 N.J. at 217, 220 A.2d at 100 (emphasis added). 
132. 47 N.J. at 218, 220, A.2d at 101. Justice Hall stated that 
regional or, for that matter, local institutions generally recognized as serving the 
public welfare [i.e., by their true-exempt status] are too important to be prevented 
from locating on available, appropriate sites, subject to reasonable qualifications 
and safeguards • . • • 
47 N.J. at 223, 220 A.2d at 103 (emphasis added). It would appear that the same objec-
tion is appropriate to Justice Hall's view as was made to the National Land 6- Invest• 
ment decision (see note 79 supra and accompanying text)-that is, that the result seems 
correct but the legal logic seems to escape definition. To ask which institutions are 
so "important" harkens back to the question posed by the Euclid case (see text ac-
companying notes 1-2 supra). Even assuming an "important" use, which local measures 
are justified in restricting the location and operation of that use? 
133. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. 
134. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. 
135. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962). 
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possibility that future state legislation may indicate a public policy 
in favor of any of these excluded uses. For instance, if New Jersey 
should enact a statute declaring that it is the policy of the state 
to encourage low-income housing for ghetto residents, by the Ho-Ho-
Kus rationale the municipality would at least have to show legitimate 
public-welfare reasons for interfering with this policy. Of course, 
in such a case, it would first be necessary to isolate at least in general 
terms the public involved in the particular local decision in order 
that the relevant state policies could be ascertained.136 If one could 
show, first, that the ordinance would affect those within the core 
city presently living in undesirable housing, and second, that relevant 
state policies favor new low-income housing and a redistribution of 
the population out of the ghetto, the presumption of invalidity 
should arise to be rebutted by the municipality. 
The most obvious difficulty in this area of policy considerations 
is in distinguishing statutory authority from statutory policy. Regard-
ing the former, the local enactment may be invalidated under a 
supremacy argument if the court finds that the power to make the 
zoning decision has been withheld from the municipality in the 
zoning enabling act as a matter of legislative intention. Regarding 
the latter, the local authorities have the authority to make zoning 
decisions subject to the police power limitations--and statutory policy 
will indicate wherein lies the public welfare that circumscribes the 
police power. The issues presented here arise from a coexistence of 
statute and ordinance rather than from a conflict between them.137 
136. For instance, what might be intolerable policy-wise in a crowded suburb of 
Newark may simply have no policy implications at all in a less settled area of the state. 
See Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). Of course, as 
Justice Hall indicated in the Ho-Ho-Kus case, some policy considerations may not 
depend on the external impact of an ordinance when the stated policy touches the lives 
of the residents of the municipality itself. 47 N.J. at 218, 220 A.2d at IOI CTustice Hall, 
concurring). There are limitations on how much the majority may demand of the 
minority even within the identical constituency. 
137. It is admittedly often difficult to make the distinction on a case-by-case basis, 
and courts often talk in terms of both issues simultaneously. See note 128 supra. An 
excellent example is the opinion of the Pennsylvania supreme court in School Dist. v. 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965). See note 104 supra. 
The difficulty in distinguishing the pre-emptive situation from a statutory-policy 
consideration is also seen in Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 
18 N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955). In that case the court found that a local enactment 
excluding state highway service areas from the municipality was invalid as not being 
in furtherance of the public welfare. Although there was a statutory grant to the 
highway department to construct highways through New Jersey and it could well be 
argued that service areas are a necessary incident of such highways, the court chose 
instead to read the statute as creating a policy in favor of such uses as promoting the 
public welfare: 
The need for new highway construction has been expressly recognized by the 
Federal Government and the various states-the belief is widespread that the 
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Perhaps the most eloquent proponent for using statutory policies 
to define the general welfare was Justice Edwards in his minority 
opinion in Certain-Teed Products Corporation v. Paris Township.138 
In that case, plaintiff corporation discovered gypsum in Paris Town-
ship, Michigan, and sought from the township the rezoning of the 
area from residential to industrial so that it could construct a mining 
and manufacturing facility. The Michigan court was no doubt im-
pressed with the external impact of the local decision: "Here we have 
no mere zoning case. Its impact without doubt will be felt for years 
to come in great areas of Michigan where zoning is as yet unknown."13tl 
While the majority was content to shift the burden of proof of public 
benefit to the municipality because of its concern for valuable 
mineral rights,140 the minority, speaking through Justice Edwards, 
determined that the public affected by the ban on mining and manu-
facturing was the general public and that, for it, the relevant state 
statutes favored the development of such industries: 
On the basis of evidence presented to us in this record, we believe 
that this potentially important mining and industrial operation can 
be conducted in Paris Township consistent with the zoning and de-
velopment plan of the community. It is apparent that this is an in-
dustry which, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist here. We believe 
the public policy of the State is calculated to encourage both manu-
facturing and mining [statutory citations omitted]. In the adminis-
tration of our zoning laws, while we seek to protect our homes, we 
must likewise take into account the public interest in the encourage-
ment of full employment and vigorous industry.141 
Thus, on balance, local interests were insufficient to outweigh 
state policies since those policies could not be compromised. As dis-
cussed below,142 courts have often taken judicial notice of such 
economic considerations as preserving valuable mineral rights, but 
in Certain-Teed the challenger was able to shift the burden by 
need is very urgent and that we cannot afford to wait •••• But these rights [of 
individual property owners], valuable as they are, must, in the public interest, 
give way to the greater good for the greater number •••. 
18 N.J. at 248, 113 A.2d at 664. 
Thus, dominant policy considerations rather than preclusion of local regulation 
indicated that the public's interests lay in building highway service areas and that 
local ordinances attempting to exclude such uses would be constitutionally invalid 
rather than statutorily pre-empted. 
138. 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705 (1958). 
139. 351 Mich. at 467, 88 N.W.2d at 722. 
140. See, e.g., City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929), 
141. 351 Mich. at 464-65, 88 N.W.2d at 720-21. 
142. See notes 144-59 infra and accompanying text. 
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reference to state statutory policies relevant to the general public 
that would have been affected by the prohibition. Obviously, a point 
of impasse is reached when states seek to encourage industrial devel-
opment and local subdivisions seek to prohibit such uses under their 
delegated zoning powers. When a claimant can assert that because 
of external factors a local enactment is in derogation of a relevant 
statutory policy, the burden of going forward with proof of public 
benefit should shift to the zoning body. It is important to distinguish 
at this point between the effects upon the public concerned and the 
effects upon the use concerned. In order to make out a presumption-
shifting prima facie case, a claimant should be required to show that 
the policy relevant to the public concerned will be thwarted vis-a-vis 
that public, not merely that a desirable use will be hindered. For 
instance, in Southern Railway Company v. City of Richmond,143 the 
plaintiff railroad sought to expand its yard, which was located in a 
residential area. In challenging the reasonableness of the restrictive 
zoning ordinance, the railroad referred to its statutory duty to pro-
vide service to the public and asserted that the ordinance prohibiting 
its expansion would interfere with state policies favoring good public 
transportation. The court sustained the ordinance, holding that the 
railroad failed to show that the relevant public would be adversely 
affected. The fact that the railroad would be so affected was immate-
rial without a showing that the ordinance would impair its ability 
to provide public service. Under the interpretation of the Virginia 
court, the statute requiring railroads to serve the public was meant 
to benefit the public and not the railroads except to the extent that 
the two are coincident. 
3. Judicial Notice of Uses Favoring the Public Welfare 
Courts frequently react to a particular use by finding that it is 
so valuable or necessary for the well-being of the area that it will 
take judicial notice of the beneficial effects and require a zoning 
municipality to justify its decision to exclude or restrict the use. 
Again, these decisions identify the relevant public and balance the 
welfare of that public against the local interests at stake.144 
143. 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964). 
144. Again, it is important to distinguish those situations that involve the welfare 
of the municipal residents themselves and those in which the courts are moved by the 
external public affected by the use. Only this second category can be considered truly 
regional. For instance, in Certain-Teed Products (see text accompanying notes 138-41 
supra), the exclusion of the use would have had a statewide impact and thus the public 
welfare at stake was that of the state as a whole. Similarly, in the present category 
of decisions the courts evidence an awareness of who will be affected by the local 
ordinance in assessing its relation to the public welfare. If a hospital serves two com-
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The most common instances in which a judicial-notice approach 
has been applied to zoning cases have involved hospitals and sanitar-
iums, which are of obvious importance to the public health and 
well-being. A municipality attempting to exclude hospitals must 
invariably overcome the initial judicial attitude that hospitals directly 
promote what zoning only indirectly promotes--the public welfare. 
In Sisters of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe,145 the 
Michigan court of appeals verbalized the judicial attitude: 
... not only is there no relation to the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare of this community served by the passage of the 
ordinance in question [imposing height, area and parking require-
ments upon plaintiff hospital that would render it a nonconforming 
use and deny it its vital expansion] but ... in effect the enforcement 
of this ordinance might have a serious adverse effect upon the public 
health of the defendant city and its neighboring communities.146 
Similarly, in American University v. Prentiss,141 a federal district 
court struck down an ordinance that would have prohibited the con-
struction of a hospital in conjunction with the nursing school at 
American University's Washington, D.C., campus. While comment-
ing on both hospital and educational needs of the area, Judge Holt-
zoff took judicial notice of the shortage of hospital beds within the 
District of Columbia and the fact that Congress was making grants-
in-aid to encourage new hospital construction. In weighing the 
local interest in excluding the hospital from a residential area, the 
court found that noise would not be a serious problem, that the 
streets were ample to handle the traffic, and that property in the 
vicinity would not depreciate to the extent claimed by the protest-
ing home-owners. Thus, the community was unable to justify its 
restriction and in the balance the public health won out. 
In an indirect fashion a New Jersey court in Kunzler v. Hoff-
man148 likewise took judicial notice of the importance of hospitals 
munities within the state, it is absurd to assess the reasonableness of its exclusion 
based on the needs of the entire state, of the region, or even of the metropolitan area 
for that matter. The proper criterion should be the welfare of the public involved in 
the exclusion. This analysis avoids many unnecessary intellectual dilemmas in those 
situations in which, for instance, there is state saturation but a local need, or vice 
versa. Moreover, if a court is to look to the availability of alternative sites, how far 
shall it look? In Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 
342, 154 N.W.2d 644 (1967), the Michigan court of appeals noted that the hospital 
served not only the Grosse Pointe area but a large area of the adjoining city of Detroit 
as well. 
145. 8 Mich. App. 342, 154 N.W.2d 644 (1967). 
146. 8 Mich. App. at 351, 154 N.W.2d at 648-49. 
147. 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953). 
148. 48 N.J. 277, 225 A.2d 321 (1966). 
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and sanitariums to the public welfare. In deciding that the grant 
of a variance to a hospital for emotionally disturbed persons did 
indeed promote the public welfare, the court took notice of the 
need for such institutions within the state.149 The language of the 
opinion suggests that the New Jersey exclusionary-regionalism doc-
trine may at least be tempered when such beneficial uses are in-
volved.150 
In other situations, courts have taken judicial notice of the pub-
lic-welfare aspect of the need for schools and churches,m of the 
need for parochial schools,152 and of the value of an airport to a 
metropolitan community.153 
Historically, natural resources have posed a unique problem 
for the courts since when resources are not taken where they are 
found, they are lost to the state forever. Thus, prohibiting the tak-
ing of minerals presents a question of statewide importance. In 
City of North Muskegon v. 1ifiller,m the court invalidated a zoning 
ordinance that prohibited the taking of oil or gas within the city 
of Muskegon, Michigan, holding that the opportunity to exploit 
valuable mineral interests should not be cut off "unless serious con-
sequences will flow [from not doing so]."155 The Pennsylvania 
supreme court reached a similar result in Exton Quarries, Incorpo-
rated v. West Whitehead Township,156 when it struck down an 
149. The court pointed out that 
[t]here are only two such hospitals currently in operation in this state. It cannot 
be questioned, particularly in view of this need, that providing another such 
hospital for the treatment of mentally disturbed persons furthers the public 
welfare. 
48 N.J. at 286, 225 A.2d at 326. One might well ponder the effect of a similar attitude 
toward low-income housing upon an ordinance such as was sustained in the Lionshead 
case. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. 
150. Compare the Kunzler case with Mitchell v. Deisch, 179 Ark. 788, 795, 18 S.W.2d 
364, 367 (1929) (" ••• a sanitarium is not only considered a beneficent institution but a 
public necessity •• -'1· 
151. In Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 350, 172 N.E.2d 39, 43 
(1961), the court stated: "We judicially know that churches and schools promote the 
common welfare and the general public interest.'' 
152. Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245, 251, 152 A.2d 580, 583 (1959) 
(stating, in sustaining the grant of a variance, that "the education of children directly 
furthers the 'general welfare' cannot be questioned'1· See also Roman Catholic Diocese 
v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 47 N.J. 211, 220 A.2d 97 (1966). 
153. Stengel v. Crandon, 156 Fla. 592, 599, 23 So. 2d 835, 838 (1945): "[airplanes] 
represent the latest means of transportation, and certainly if we are to progress, the 
establishment of airports to accommodate them should be encouraged.'' 
154. 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929). 
155. 249 Mich. at 57,227 N.W. at 744. It should be noted, however, that the court's 
great solicitude for minerals vis-a-vis zoning did not prevent it from sustaining a non-
zoning regulation that had the effect of prohibiting drilling within the city. 249 Mich. 
at 60-63, 227 N.W. at 745-46. 
156. 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967). 
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ordinance that prohibited quarrying anywhere within the township 
because of the special consideration given to natural-resource depos-
its. In both City of North Muskegon and Exton Quarries the con-
testant made a prima fade case by showing the loss of valuable 
natural-resource deposits to the people of the state. The economic 
interests of the state naturally depend upon the particular state in-
volved and the extent to which its economy depends upon the par-
ticular resource.157 In any event, making valuable mineral deposits 
unavailable without some commensurate benefit to the public is 
properly a subject of judicial notice since the exploitation of min-
erals is usually relevant to the prosperity and welfare of the entire 
state.158 
This discussion of judicial notice of state policies is intended 
to suggest an approach rather than to be an exhaustive treatment 
of the special uses involved. The decisions indicate that many uses 
are capable of evoking similar judicial responses, so that the re-
sponse, not the specific use, may be used in developing doctrine in 
this area. Courts may, and often do, take judicial notice of the pub-
lic's interest in a particular use, at least when that interest appears 
on the face of the controversy. The judicially noticed policies may 
pertain to the external impact of the ordinance or to the residents 
of the zoning municipality. When the invocation of judicial notice 
is appropriate, the effect is to shift the burden to the municipality 
to demonstrate the local conditions that it deems to outweigh the 
obvious benefits of the use to the public at large. As a constitutional 
limitation upon the zoning power, the courts may require a weaker 
or stronger showing of local justification depending upon the na-
ture of the benefit arising from the anticipated use. Indeed, later 
decisions indicate that when the showing is sufficiently strong, there 
157. In Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945), the 
Massachusetts court sustained an ordinance that prohibited the taking of topsoil within 
the town. Resources, the court stated, are to be treated just like any other use of land. 
However, in Midland Elec. Coal Corp. v. Knox County, 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 
(1953), the court invalidated an ordinance that would have prohibited the taking of 
coal. In distinguishing the Burlington case, the Illinois court found that "coal is not 
so plentiful as topsoil." I Ill. 2d at 218, 115 N.E.2d at 285. In order to destroy the more 
valuable mineral rights, a higher justification is required-meaning, no doubt, a 
stronger showing on the part of the municipality of the relation of the ordinance to 
the public welfare. In those states in which mineral extraction is more significant to 
the economy of the whole state, that required justification increases proportionately, 
See Wengert, Resource Development and the Public Interest: A Challenge for Research, 
I NAT. REs. J. 207 (1961); Note, 46 N.C. L. REv. 103, supra note 123. 
158. See, e.g., Cleveland Builders Supply Co. v. City of Garfield Heights, 102 Ohio 
App. 69, 136 N.E.2d 105 (1956). 
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is virtually no limit on tlie use conditions that a municipality may 
impose on the individual property mvner.159 
C. Operation of the Antipresumption 
By referring to the state policies-constitutional, statutory, or 
judicially noticed-relevant to the public whose interests are at 
stake, the courts have a ready analytical tool with which to evaluate 
the reasonableness of a particular zoning ordinance. As indicated 
earlier,160 it is an analytical position in which courts appear to feel 
relatively comfortable, and it is capable of fostering planning as 
·well as providing a coherent basis for decisions.161 
The practice of policy reference serves to isolate the issues in 
the dispute by requiring the municipality to bring forth its reasons 
for the enactment when the ordinance, on its face, seems to be con-
trary to the true public welfare. Typically, under a presumption of 
validity, the municipality need not come fonvard with its reasons 
for taking the particular action,162 and the most invidious motiva-
159. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). 
160. See te.xt accompan}ing notes 114-15 supra. 
161. Such a process was envisioned by Justice Hall in his dissent in Vickers v. 
Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 260, 181 A.2d 129, 141 (1962): 
While it has long been conventional for courts to test the validity of local legis-
lation by the criterion of whether a fairly debatable question is presented, and 
if so to sustain it, it makes all the difference in the world how a court deals with 
that criterion. Proper judicial review to me can be nothing less than an objective, 
realistic consideration of the setting-the evils or conditions sought to be remedied, 
a full and comparative appraisal of the public interest involved and the private 
rights affected, both from the local and broader aspects, and a thorough weighing 
of all factors, with government entitled to win if the scales are at least balanced 
or even a little less so. Of course, such a process involves judgment and the 
meamrement can never be made mathematically exact. But that is what judges 
are for-to evaluate and protect all interests, including those of individuals and 
minorities, regardless of personal likes or views of wisdom, and not merely to 
rubber-stamp governmental action in a kind of judicial laissez-faire. 
However, as has already been indicated (see text accompanying notes 50-51 supra), the 
New Jersey court has, at times, followed the logic espoused by Justice Hall in making 
just such an evaluation. It would seem that whenever a would-be user can convince 
the court of the value of its particular use the court undertakes just such an evaluation. 
The judicial machinery is available for such a process; when it will be used remains 
clouded in mystery. 
162. The typical judicial inquiry centers on whether there is some evidence on 
which the legislature could have reasonably based its decision, so that it is not palpably 
arbitrary or capricious. See cases cited in note 5 supra. Perhaps the most illustrative 
case is Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, 132 N.W.2d 16 (1965). A challenge 
was made to the action of the city's common council in adopting a fluoridation 
ordinance. The court took judicial notice of the availability of some evidence sustain-
ing the beneficial effects of fluoridation (even though there was also a contrary body 
of knowledge) and thus granted summary judgment for the defendant. Citing Jacobson 
v. Massaclmsetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904), the Michigan supreme court, in affirming, 
held: "It is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two 
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tion may be present without being articulated. It would appear 
that a requirement of articulation will expose local parochialism 
when it is contrary to the public interest and force local legislators 
to consider carefully their reasons for enacting an ordinance when 
larger public interests may be at stake. It is interesting to speculate 
about the effect of such a requirement in cases such as Lionshead 
Lake, Incorporated v. Wayne Township.163 The additional prob-
lem with cases such as Lionshead is that the relevant state policies 
relate to basic social needs-such as housing-that are not em-
bodied in a recognized institutional form. Therefore, these cases 
are less likely to be analyzed like a case involving a hospital or a 
public utility since the respective interests are not so easily brought 
before the court. On the other hand, under the procedure suggested 
in this Article, the institutionalization of the use is immaterial 
since if the would-be user can cite relevant public policy, he im-
mediately puts his use under a cloak of prima facie protection. By 
showing a relevant public whose interests may be adversely affected, 
the contestant forces the municipality to make its showing of local 
benefit. The proposition, although not the theory behind it, is ably 
stated by Judge Keating in Fulling v. Palumbo: 164 
. . . until it is demonstrated that some legitimate purpose will be 
served by restricting the use of petitioner's property, he has sufficient 
standing to challenge the ordinance. Once it is demonstrated that 
some legitimate public interest will be served by the restriction, then 
before the property owner can succeed in an attack upon the ordi-
nance as applied, he must demonstrate that the hardship caused 
[constitutes a taking].165 
Similarly, a Florida court has used an antipresumption upon a 
modes was likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against 
disease." 374 Mich. at 420, 132 N.W.2d at 22. Thus in such a case, as is also true with 
zoning judgments, the legislature need only point to reasons upon which it could 
have based its decision, rather than explain on which factor it actually did so. 
163. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952). See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. 
164. 21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967). 
165. 21 N.Y.2d at 35, 233 N.E.2d at 274, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 253. In Aucello v. Moylan, 60 
Misc. 2d 1094, 304 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1969), a New York court went even further in 
interpreting Fulling: 
• • • the showing by a property owner that he will suffer "significant economic 
injury" ••• or "severe financial loss" ••• by the application of an area standard 
ordinance is "sufficient to entitle him to relief" ••. , unless the municipality comes 
forward with proof that the standard is justified because "the public health, safety 
and welfare will be served by upholding the application of the standard" ••• and 
it is not until such a showing has been made that the property owner "must dem-
01:1strate tha~ the hardship caused [by the application] amounts to a taking of 
his property • . • . 
60 Misc. 2d at 1098-99, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 769. But see Gardner v. Downer, 61 Misc. 2d 
131, 305 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1969). 
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showing that changed conditions in the neighborhood rendered an 
ordinance unreasonable.166 Although one might argue that the 
triggering mechanism for the antipresumption should be some im-
portant state policy, the cases discussed above do indicate the rela-
tive ease with which the courts can require an affirmative showing 
by the zoning municipality under the proper circumstances.167 
There is no doubt room for experimentation with the basic prem-
ise but only to effect a meaningful balancing of local versus external 
(metropolitan) interests in those cases in which external interests 
are actually at stake. 
The process outlined here does not mean that regional interests 
will prevail in every case nor that parochialism is dead and buried. 
What is intended is a universally applicable statement of principle 
by which courts may gauge those situations in which local or re-
gional interests should prevail. As our metropolitan areas increase 
in size and complexity, relevant regional values should be injected 
into the zoning process as they become apparent, while those func-
tions that localities may best perform and those that are immediately 
of great concern to the health, safety, or well-being of local citizens 
remain in local hands. 
D. The Balancing Process 
Once relevant external policies are before the court and the 
municipality has come forward with its justifications for the zoning 
ordinance, the court is in the familiar position of balancing external 
and internal considerations to determine which interests best pro-
mote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. "[T]he 
strictly local interests of the tmrn must yield if it appears that they 
are plainly in conflict with the general interests of the public at 
large, and in such instances the interests of the 'municipality would 
not be allowed to stand in the way.' "168 Consequently, the owner 
of property will not have his rights limited except in the "public" 
166. Burrit v. Harris, 172 S.2d 820 (Fla. 1965). In referring to the Burrit decision 
a Florida district court subsequently stated: 
In its opinion the Supreme Court pointed out that the evidence failed to establish 
that the zoning restriction there in question bears substantially on the public 
health, morals, safety, or welfare of the community. By this holding the Supreme 
Court has created an innovation in the zoning law of Florida by casting on the 
zoning authority the burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that 
the zoning restrictions under attack "bear substantially on the public health, 
morals, safety or welfare of the community" if the ordinance is to be sustained. 
Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 S.2d 767, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
167. See notes 164-66 supra and accompanying text. 
168. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 566, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942), 
quoting the statement from Euclid in text accompanying note 2 supra. 
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interest-and that public is not necessarily regional, metropolitan, 
or strictly local, but rather the public that is relevant to the con-
sequences of the restriction in question. 
I. Policy Evaluation 
In determining the extent to which local requirements may out-
weigh metropolitan, regional, or state policies, the courts should 
consider whether those policies are inherently incapable of fruition 
by local action or whether local action may be wholly consistent 
with them. For instance, one may readily perceive a distinction be-
tween school building safety inspection169-an essentially local in-
terest-and the maintenance of highways170 or public utilities171 
-regional or state interests. In attempting to draw some meaning-
ful distinction in actual cases, four criteria are suggested for deter-
mining the "strength" of the relevant external policy in question. 
First, is the policy one that is already being implemented at the 
state or regional level such that local intervention will only tend to 
interfere with its success? 
Second, is the policy one dealing with a problem or use that 
is generally considered local in nature or is it one generally con-
sidered to be identified at a higher political level? 
Third, has a solution to the problem to which the policy is rele-
vant already been attempted unsuccessfully at the local level? 
Fourth, is the policy in question one that by its very nature does 
not lend itself to local resolution because of physical, economic, or 
geographic limitations of the community? 
In utilizing these criteria to assess the strength of the policy in 
question, it is important to remember that what is being considered 
is the weight to be given to one factor in a balancing process, not a 
limitation on local zoning powers. Obviously, a relevant policy 
that has a statewide impact should be given more weight in assessing 
the external public welfare than one that is in perfect harmony 
with local prerogative. Certainly one would expect, as has been the 
case in the special use situations referred to,172 that policies tend-
ing to have more external impact as suggested by the four criteria 
above should require a greater showing of local benefit to justify 
an encroachment on individual property rights. 
169. See School Dist. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 
(1965). 
170. See Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 113 
A.2d 658 (1955). 
171. Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 382 Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1968). 
172. See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra. 
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2. Local Values at Stake 
There is a generally recognized spectrum of local considerations 
that should weigh upon the balancing process.173 Highest on the 
spectrum are considerations that affect local health or safety di-
rectly. Thus, local traffic problems, unsafe buildings, and similar 
problems strengthen any argument for sustaining local action. At 
the other end of the scale are factors such as social segregation, eco-
nomic segregation, and aesthetics, which should have little persua-
sive value in sustaining the reasonableness of local action. It is 
interesting to contemplate a corollary of the Euclid caveat as it per-
tains to a municipality's reliance on economic values to justify ex-
cluding a socially beneficial use-that just as an individual must 
bear some economic hardship for the betterment of all, so too must 
the municipality, which is after all a collection of private persons. 
In response to a municipality's attempt to exclude a church and 
•;chool, the Indiana supreme court stated: 
In the Euclid Case ... it was specifically shown that the restrictions 
destroyed part of the value of the owner's property, yet the sho';Ving 
was made that the restrictions ... were for the general welfare, safety 
and health. It would seem that the contrary would also be true-that 
if a use is shown to be without question for the good of the public 
and general welfare, that no owner of private property adjacent or 
in the neighborhood, could complain because the value of his prop-
erty might be thereby depreciated to some extent, since the purpose 
of the zoning laws is not to protect private, personal interests, but 
rather to protect and promote general public interest.174 
In the middle of the scale are values such as "preserving the 
character of the neighborhood." Considerations such as light, air, 
traffic, fire prevention, amenities, and the like are no doubt legiti-
mate considerations in the abstract, but their relative value may 
diminish greatly when confronted by broader external policies. 
The assessment of these values must proceed from an articulated 
basis of what is at stake in the particular case and a realistic view of 
173. See, e.g., Comment, Government Control of Land: Protecting the I-Know-It-
When-1-See-It Interest, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 428, 436 (1967), wherein the author suggests 
such a spectrum of factors to be employed in assessing the reasonableness of a zoning 
regulation. 
174. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 349, 172 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1961). 
See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 
N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1955). In defending a challenge to a zoning ordinance 
the municipality is often heard to assert this argument on behalf of its constituents. See 
American University v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953). The logic of the 
Schulte case would seem to be of equal force regardless of who is making the argu-
ment, the individual property owners or the municipality itself. 
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the harm that probably will befall the community if its ordinance 
is struck down.11r; 
3. Geographic Considerations 
Geographic considerations are probably among the most difficult 
factors to delineate with any exactness. It is, nonetheless, important 
to consider the geographic character of the area as it pertains to the 
relevant public. If a particular use is to serve a public consisting of 
a core city and a suburb, for instance, the geographic configuration of 
this particular area should be considered in assessing the reason-
ableness of the local action. As has been discussed above,176 the avail-
ability of alternative sites within this relevant area tends to foster 
exclusionary practices, as well as the possibility of intermunicipal 
retaliation. Moreover, geographic factors tend to be an inexact 
guide for extrapolating relevant policy considerations; institution-
alizing them in an alternative-availability doctrine would be push-
ing a theoretical tool to its practical illogic. But courts should be 
ready to consider the converse of the availability approach-that 
is, they should favor a beneficial use when there are no other avail-
able sites within the relevant area. 
4. Reference to the Regional Plan 
Finally, the courts should give due deference to a showing by 
the municipality that its ordinance is based upon, and is in fur-
therance of, the regional plan, if one exists. Obviously, municipal-
175. Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Municipal 
Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720, 733-34 (1962) suggests a distinction between unusual 
detriment to the community and ordinary detriment: 
• • . unusual detriment-those undesirable effects which would result from the 
interaction of the use with unique environmental conditions in the neighborhood 
where it proposes to locate-and customary detriment-those undesirable effects 
which invariably attend the presence of churches, hospitals, schools and the like. 
Courts disregard the customary detriment which attends the presence of such 
institutions in the community on the grounds that this detriment is merely an 
inevitable social cost of the highly valued and indispensable services which they 
render. So long as some neighborhood or community must bear this detriment, 
no single community is entitled to rid itself of the burden by simply shifting it to 
another. However, if a showing of unusual detriment is made by the community, 
the exclusionary provision may be sustained. 
Although this distinction seems very appealing in the abstract, it does beg the question 
in most cases. No two institutions or communities are the same and in each case, no 
doubt, a parade of horribles could be conjured up that would be peculiar to the 
particular community: traffic problems, financial structure, relation with other com-
munities, topography, and the like. Offering a "yes or no" solution only portends the 
same problems currently facing the courts-that is, the invocations become handy labels 
for deciding cases the way a judge thinks they should be decided but without offering 
any lasting doctrinaire guidance. It would be more helpful to constructive thinking 
to isolate a spectrum of considerations rather than to provide so handy a category for 
justifying exclusion. 
176. See notes 65, 80-82, & 86 supra and accompanying text. 
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ities should be encouraged to consult the plan on a voluntary basis, 
and to the extent permissible under the facts of a given case, they 
should be given credit for having done so.177 Thus, the plan "is a 
point of view which should be introduced in a courtroom when a 
particular measure is being assayed."178 
If the plan is to be given weight in this process, however, the 
court should require the zoning municipality to rely on more than 
a single provision of the plan. The favored conduct is not subse-
quent reference to the plan to attempt to justify what has been 
done, but rather the municipality's looking to the plan as a sort of 
"impermanent constitution"179 governing its growth and the growth 
of the region in which it is located. Therefore, the zoning body 
should be required to show a pattern of reference to the plan as a 
matter of internal procedure in order to have the factor weighed 
in the balancing process. Upon such a showing the court may at 
least be assured that the ordinance and the plan are not related 
merely by coincidence. One should at least expect some evidence 
that the regional plan entered into the deliberations of the local 
legislative body and that the affected owner was notified that the 
local legislature was zoning by reference to the plan. The courts 
must also take notice of the extent to which the plan has been up-
dated, the sorts of functions it purports to perform, and the general 
acceptance of the plan among the communities in the region. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the introductory remarks to this Article indicated, what is 
portrayed here is an approach to regional land-use problems, rather 
than a definitive solution. The cases are of infinitive variety, and vir-
177. Such reference would seem to connote an element of forethought and design. 
See Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1955). 
While the actual bearing on the particular case may be of greater or lesser import, the 
social utility gained by encouraging the action should certainly find its way into the 
judicial considerations. 
In ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE xxxvi (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968), the 
American Law Institute suggests: "Thus one method of inducing local communities 
to plan will be to give more protection to an ordinance or administrative order of a 
community which has a plan." 
178. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw &: CONTEMP. 
PROB. 353, 376 (1955). Professor Haar points out that there is little real hope for any 
greater relation between planning and zoning: 
[.f]his seems the limited function to which the master plan can withdraw in 
order to perform most effectively in the grand effort to improve American cities: 
A reminder of the myriad of activities affecting land, their inter-relation, their 
long-run effects which the day-to-day administrator is too busy to consider. 
Id. at 375-76. 
179. See id. 
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tually unlimited combinations of factors must be considered. There-
fore, what is suggested is an approach that hopefully will accomplish 
what present dogma has failed to accomplish-the development of a 
rational and coherent theory of police power limitations on local zon-
ing. Whether by design or default, the problem of land-use media-
tion in metropolitan areas will continue for some indefinite time to 
be a matter of judicial concern. There is good reason to argue that 
this is exactly as it should be; that the judiciary is capable, in its role 
as constitutional overseer, of achieving a more flexible and rational 
solution than can be achieved by legislation. Through a balancing 
process such as is suggested, courts can resolve cases while paying 
particular regard to metropolitan and regional, as well as local, con-
ditions. 
The approach suggested in this Article, while not definitive by 
any means, does offer a rational mechanism for reaching the best 
decision in each case. It envisions a uniform statement of doctrine 
to guide local actions prospectively. Furthermore, decisions will be 
articulated, balancing local against relevant external interests. 
Through this articulation and balancing, the suggested approach 
offers to the judiciary the opportunity to formulate doctrine in 
those cases in which it is demonstrated that larger interests may be 
at stake. This is not to say that the local decision will never be up-
held180-rather, that we should know why it is when it is. Vve need 
to know, in the constitutional sense, when it is that "the municipal-
ity [will] not be allowed to stand in the way."181 
180. See B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (1961): 
It is not suggested here that an absolute prohibition should attach to all ordinances 
which have the effect of segregating with reference to economic means. Some 
social goal of the whole metropolitan area must be shown to require such segrega-
tion, however; the preservation of local property interests is not sufficient. [Em-
phasis added.] 
Likewise what is here suggested is the maximum amount of local prerogative consistent 
with metropolitan or regional or statewide interests. 
181. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). 
